

IiAS stance vis-à-vis legal requirements

This document is being written in compliance with SEBI Circular SEBI/HO/IMD/DF1/CIR/P/2020/147 dated 3 August 2020 and is to be read in conjunction with [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#). Please check this page periodically for changes.

Table of Contents

FOR CORPORATE ENTITIES	3
1. ADOPTION OF ACCOUNTS	3
2. APPOINTMENT/ RE-APPOINTMENT OF AUDITORS	3
3. CASUAL VACANCY CAUSED BY AUDITOR RESIGNATION	4
4. APPOINTMENT OF BRANCH AUDITORS.....	4
5. APPOINTMENT OF AUDITORS IN GOVERNMENT COMPANIES	5
6. REMOVAL OF AUDITORS	5
7. APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARIAL AUDITORS	6
8. REMUNERATION TO COST AUDITORS.....	6
9. DIVIDEND DECLARATION.....	7
10. DIRECTOR ATTENDANCE.....	7
11. APPOINTMENT/ RE-APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS.....	8
12. OVER BOARDING.....	9
13. DIRECTORS HOLDING MORE THAN ONE EXECUTIVE POSITION	10
14. APPROVE NOT FILLING CASUAL VACANCY ON BOARD	10
15. APPOINTMENT/RE-APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS (EXECUTIVE/NON-EXECUTIVE NON-INDEPENDENT).....	11
16. REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS.....	12
17. CHANGE IN BOARD SIZE	12
18. REMUNERATION TO EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS.....	13
19. MINIMUM REMUNERATION/WAIVER OF EXCESS REMUNERATION – EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS.....	14
20. REMUNERATION TO NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS.....	14
21. REMUNERATION EXCEEDING 50% OF TOTAL NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION.....	15
22. ALTERATION TO MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION (MoA)	15
23. ALTERATION OF OBJECTS CLAUSE	16
24. SHIFTING OF REGISTERED OFFICE.....	16
25. ALTERATION TO SHARE CAPITAL.....	17
26. ALTERATION TO ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION (AOA).....	17
27. CHARGE FOR SENDING DOCUMENTS THROUGH A PARTICULAR MODE TO SHAREHOLDERS.....	18
28. ISSUANCE OF EQUITY SHARES/ PREFERENTIAL ISSUE OF SHARES	18
29. ISSUE OF WARRANTS	19
30. VARIATION OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS	19
31. DELISTING OF EQUITY SHARES (FROM ALL THE RECOGNISED STOCK EXCHANGES).....	20
32. DELISTING FROM ANY ONE STOCK EXCHANGE	20
33. ISSUANCE/RATIFICATION OF ESOP SCHEMES.....	21
34. ESOPs TO LISTED HOLDING/SUBSIDIARY AND ASSOCIATE COMPANIES.....	22

35.	MODIFICATION/VARIATION TO ESOP SCHEMES	23
36.	ISSUE OF STOCK OPTIONS EXCEEDING 1% OF ISSUED CAPITAL	23
37.	INCREASE IN BORROWING LIMITS	24
38.	FIXED DEPOSITS FROM MEMBERS/PUBLIC.....	24
39.	CREATION OF CHARGE ON COMPANY'S ASSETS.....	25
40.	ISSUE OF NCDs/ DEBT INSTRUMENTS ON PRIVATE PLACEMENT BASIS	25
41.	ISSUE OF PREFERENCE SHARES	25
42.	INTER-CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS	26
43.	LOANS TO COMPANIES IN WHICH DIRECTORS ARE INTERESTED (SEC 185).....	26
44.	OFFICE OF PROFIT	27
45.	RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS	28
46.	ROYALTY PAYMENTS	29
47.	CHARITABLE DONATIONS.....	29
48.	SALE OF ASSETS / SLUMP SALE	30
49.	RECLASSIFICATION OF PROMOTERS.....	30
50.	BUYBACK.....	31
51.	SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT	32
52.	SHAREHOLDER DIRECTOR IN PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS.....	32
53.	ISSUE OF BONUS SHARES.....	33
54.	BONUS DEBENTURES	33
55.	OPTION TO LENDERS TO CONVERT LOAN INTO EQUITY	34
56.	REMUNERATION TO NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN CASE OF LOSS OR INADEQUACY OF PROFITS.....	34
57.	REVISED FEMA RULES FOR NRI/OCI	35
58.	KEEPING REGISTERS AND RETURNS AT A PLACE OTHER THAN THE REGISTERED OFFICE	35
59.	CAPITAL REDUCTION	35
60.	COMPENSATION OR PROFIT-SHARING AGREEMENTS.....	36
61.	APPROVAL OF SPECIAL RIGHTS POST IPO (RATIFICATION OF RIGHTS NOT EMBEDDED IN THE AOA)	37
62.	MIGRATION TO MAIN BOARD FROM SME PLATFORM	37
63.	CHANGE IN THE USE OF IPO PROCEEDS	38
64.	APPOINTMENT OF ALTERNATE DIRECTOR.....	38
	SEBI (REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS) REGULATIONS, 2014	39
65.	ADOPTION OF ACCOUNTS	39
66.	ADOPTION OF VALUATION REPORT	39
67.	APPOINTMENT OF VALUER.....	40
68.	APPOINTMENT AND REMUNERATION OF AUDITOR	40
69.	REMOVAL OF STATUTORY AUDITORS	41
70.	APPROVAL OF BORROWINGS	41
71.	CHANGE IN REMUNERATION PAYABLE TO MEMBERS OF GOVERNING BOARD.....	41
72.	ISSUE OF UNITS BY REIT	42
73.	CHANGE TO THE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT	42
74.	DECLASSIFICATION OF THE STATUS OF SPONSOR	43
75.	CHANGE IN SPONSOR	43
76.	RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS.....	44
	SEBI (INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TRUSTS) REGULATIONS, 2014	45
77.	ADOPTION OF ACCOUNTS	45
78.	ADOPTION OF VALUATION REPORT	45

79.	APPOINTMENT OF VALUER	45
80.	APPROVAL OF STATUTORY AUDITOR'S APPOINTMENT	46
81.	REMOVAL OF STATUTORY AUDITORS	47
82.	APPROVAL FOR BORROWING LIMITS	47
83.	CHANGE IN SPONSOR	48
84.	DE-CLASSIFICATION OF THE STATUS OF SPONSOR	48
85.	APPROVE CHANGE IN INVESTMENT STRATEGY OR IN MANAGEMENT FEES.....	48
86.	APPROVE RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS.....	49
87.	ISSUE OF UNITS BY INVIT	49
88.	CHANGE TO THE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT	50

For corporate entities

1. Adoption of accounts

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 129(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, at every annual general meeting, the Board of Directors of the company shall lay the financial statements for the financial year for adoption by shareholders.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS believes that a comprehensive review of the financials of a company is a critical exercise which often requires first-hand information and proper due diligence. However, there is limited time between receipt of the audited accounts/annual report and the shareholder meeting to comprehensively evaluate the financial statements. Given this constraint, IiAS relies upon the auditors' report on the financial statements. IiAS may also factor in the quality of the audit firm and/or the composition and experience of the audit committee. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR on the resolution to adopt accounts. However, IiAS may recommend voting AGAINST where – (a) auditors have a qualified opinion on the accounts or internal financial controls; (b) we believe the quality of the audit firm and/or the audit committee are a concern; or (c) emphasis of matters outlined by auditors may that have a material impact on the financials.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. Our voting recommendation depends upon the auditor's report and their commentary thereon. In our assessment of financial statements, we will provide commentary on key financial parameters. If the company has material subsidiaries, the analysis will focus on consolidated financial statements. IiAS will highlight the observations, comments, or qualifications made in the statutory audit report and the secretarial audit report. We raise concerns, wherever relevant, on specific issues that need to be addressed by the company – these could be pertaining to cyber security issues, quantum of losses on account of frauds, or any other non-financial information. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

2. Appointment/ re-appointment of auditors

Legal Requirement:

Sec 139 of the Companies Act, 2013, mandates rotation of individual auditors every five years and of the audit firm after a maximum period of ten years (i.e., after two terms of five years each) for listed companies. A cooling-off period of five years is required, to be considered eligible for re-appointment. For banks, NBFCs and Housing finance companies, the RBI mandates auditor rotation every 3 years with a cooling-off period of 6 years. Further, as per Sec 142, the remuneration of the Statutory Auditor should be fixed at a general meeting or in any manner determined at the general meeting. Such remuneration shall include expenses, if any, incurred by the auditor in connection with the audit of the company and any facility extended but shall not include any remuneration paid to the auditor for any other services rendered at the request of the company. As per Reg 36 of the SEBI LODR, notice to shareholders for auditor (re)appointment should include an explanatory note regarding details of the fees proposed, basis of recommendation for appointment and the details/credentials of the statutory auditor. Additionally, the total fees paid to the audit network firms for all rendered services at a consolidated level must be disclosed in the annual report.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will vote on a case-to-case basis on such resolutions considering the following:

- Tenure of audit firm/network (>10 years or 3 years for banks and NBFCs) and tenure of audit partner (must not exceed five years in case of companies)
- Size of the audit firm vis-a-vis the size of the company
- Experience of the audit partner
- Experience of the audit firm in auditing companies in the same industry or of similar size or complexity

- The firm/partner(s) past track record/reputation
- Affiliation/association of the new firm/partner(s) with the rotated firm and/or the promoter group of the company
- Peer review conducted for the audit firm
- Publicly available information on the audit firm and the audit partner experience
- Quantum, growth and nature of audit fees
- Consulting services provided by network partners of the audit firm

IiAS believes that auditor tenure of over 10 consecutive years (including with group companies/spin offs of larger companies) or affiliation/association of auditors with the rotated firm or promoter group blunts the objectivity of the audit process and the independence of the auditor. Banks usually follow the tenure prescribed by RBI; however, IiAS may make an exception for banks, as the appointment of auditors is vetted or approved by RBI. IiAS believes that the experience and size of the audit firm should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the business. To enhance transparency, IiAS will take into consideration whether details including a brief profile regarding the audit partner and the audit firm is available publicly (e.g., audit firm's website) and disclosed in the notice. In line with best practices and regulation, IiAS will raise concerns in cases where auditor remuneration is not disclosed. Further basis IiAS' interpretation, IiAS will vote against auditor appointments for a term of less than five years in listed companies and 3 years in banks, NBFCs and Housing finance companies.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

3. Casual vacancy caused by auditor resignation

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 139(8) of the Companies Act, 2013, any casual vacancy in the office of an auditor due to resignation of the auditor must be filled by the Board of Directors within 30 days and should also be approved by the shareholders within three months of the recommendation of the Board and the auditor shall hold the office till the conclusion of the next AGM. In case of Government companies, the casual vacancy must be filled by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India within 30 days; failing which the board must appoint new auditors within the next 30 days. In line with Schedule III of the SEBI LODR, auditors must clearly articulate their reasons for resigning.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will decide on such proposals on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will raise concerns if the reasons for auditor resignation are not sufficiently well articulated.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

4. Appointment of branch auditors

Legal requirement:

Under Section 143 of the Companies Act 2013, Where a company has a branch office, the accounts of that office shall be audited either by the auditor appointed for the company (i.e., the statutory auditor) or by any other person qualified for appointment as an auditor of the company and appointed under Section 139. In case the branch office is situated in a country outside India, the accounts of the branch office shall be audited either by the statutory auditor or by an accountant or by any other person duly qualified to act as an auditor of the accounts of the branch office in accordance with the laws of that country, provided that the branch

auditors shall prepare a report on the accounts of the branch examined by them and send it to the auditors of the company who shall deal with it in their report in such manner as they considers necessary.

IiAS stance:

IiAS expects companies to disclose, in the shareholder notice, the size and location of branches, the details of the branch auditors being appointed, and the aggregate fees proposed to be paid to branch auditors.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

5. Appointment of auditors in Government companies

Legal Requirement:

Under Section 139(5) of the Companies Act, 2013, the auditor of a Government company or any other company owned or controlled, directly/indirectly, by the Central Government/State Government or both, in respect of a financial year, will be appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India (CAG) within a period of 180 days from the commencement of the financial year. Such auditor shall hold the office till the conclusion of the AGM. Further, as per Sec 142, the remuneration of the Statutory Auditor should be fixed at a general meeting or in any manner determined at the general meeting. Such remuneration shall include expenses, if any, incurred by the auditor in connection with the audit of the company and any facility extended but shall not include any remuneration paid to the auditor for any other services rendered at the request of the company. As per per Reg 36 of the SEBI LODR, notice to shareholders for auditor (re)appointment should include an explanatory note regarding details of the fees proposed, basis of recommendation for appointment and the details/credentials of the statutory auditor. Additionally, the total fees paid to the audit network firms for all rendered services at a consolidated level must be disclosed in the annual report.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS generally recommends voting for such resolutions because the auditors are appointed by the CAG and shareholder approval is only required to approve their remuneration. IiAS believes that shareholder approval must be sought for appointment with adequate disclosures on size/experience of the firm including its partners and the proposed audit fees. IiAS will raise concerns in cases where the name of the proposed auditor or the proposed audit fees are not disclosed either in the meeting notice or on stock exchange/company website.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

6. Removal of auditors

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 140 of the Companies Act, 2013, the auditor appointed may be removed from his office before the expiry of his term only by a special resolution of the company, after obtaining the previous approval of the Central Government.

IiAS' stance:

Since each instance of auditor removal is different in its circumstances and context, IiAS will decide on a case-to-case basis. However, IiAS may not support removal of auditors if:

- the latest audit reports (annual/quarterly) contain adverse remarks (qualification/matter of emphasis) or
- IiAS has reason to believe that the removal will undermine the integrity of the audit review or
- the board has not provided sufficient rationale for seeking the removal of auditors

IiAS carefully weighs the rationale for the removal of auditors, and will, wherever possible, wait for auditors to state their case to shareholders before making a voting recommendation.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

7. Appointment of secretarial auditors

Legal requirement

Regulation 24A of SEBI LODR; effective 1 April 2025, approval of shareholders for (re)appointment of a secretarial auditor for a listed entity. Such an auditor should be peer reviewed. The SEBI Circular dated [31 December, 2024](#) prescribes the disqualifications for a person to be appointed as a secretarial auditor. It also prescribes the prohibited services not to be rendered by the auditor directly/indirectly. Moreover, rotation of individual auditors every five years and of an audit firm after a maximum period of ten years (i.e., after two terms of five years each) is prescribed. A cooling-off period of five years is required, to be considered eligible for re-appointment. In case of a casual vacancy due to resignation, death or disqualification, the same needs to be filled within three months and the auditor should hold office till the conclusion of the next annual general meeting.

IiAS' Stance:

IiAS prefers firms being appointed as secretarial auditors – nevertheless, given the state of the industry at this stage, IiAS will support the appointment of individuals or proprietorships as secretarial auditors. IiAS may raise concerns regarding the past association with the listed company or the group wherever applicable, and / or any other factors that IiAS believes may impact the secretarial auditor's independence. IiAS will raise concerns in cases where the proposed audit fees are not disclosed either in the meeting notice or on stock exchange/company website.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

8. Remuneration to cost auditors

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 148 of the Companies Act, 2013, the remuneration to cost auditors shall be considered and approved by the Board of Directors and ratified subsequently by the shareholders of the company.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS generally recommends voting for resolutions for ratification of remuneration paid to cost auditors. In IiAS' observation, remuneration to cost auditors is usually not material.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

9. Dividend declaration

Legal Requirement:

This is governed by Sec 123 of the Companies Act, 2013. Dividend shall be recommended by the Board after consideration and approval of the financial statements. Dividend shall relate to a financial year and shall be declared by the members at the annual general meeting of the company after adoption of the financial statements.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR the proposed dividend pay-out (whether on equity or preference shares).

IiAS may advise shareholders to request a higher dividend if:

- Growth in dividend is not commensurate with the improvement in financial performance and/or growth in royalty payments and/or managerial compensation
- The dividend pay-out is consistently lower than industry average
- The company has a large cash balance and has not communicated its use of cash surplus to shareholders

IiAS may, in rare instances, caution investors and recommend voting against where:

- The company's profitability is poor, or the company is routinely reporting losses
- The company has defaulted on any of its loan obligations
- Operating cash flows are weak
- For banks or financial institutions: If the capital adequacy is hovering at the regulatory threshold

IiAS believes that dividend declaration should not favor a specific class of shareholders (e.g., promoters/controlling shareholders). Companies should have a well-articulated dividend policy. IiAS does not favor a high dividend pay-out which may impact the long-term interests of shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

10. Director attendance

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 167 of the Companies Act, 2013, the office of a director is automatically vacated if he absents himself from all the meetings of the Board of Directors held during a period of 12 months with or without seeking leave of absence. The Kotak Committee on Corporate Governance had recommended that if a director does not attend at least 50% of board meetings over 2 financial years on a rolling basis, his/her continuance on the board should be ratified by the shareholders at the next AGM – this was subsequently withdrawn.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will vote against director appointments/re-appointments based on attendance. IiAS expects 100% attendance, but for directors coming up for re-appointment, accepts a minimum attendance level of 75% in the just concluded year. In case the attendance is below this threshold, IiAS reviews the attendance over the immediately preceding three-year period. IiAS believes directors must use the available technology options (video calls) to attend board meetings, where travel is a constraint. IiAS may make an exception in case of promoters/promoter representatives actively engaged in the business and global heads/CEOs of MNCs if it believes that the presence of the global representative reflects on the company's importance within the group and its ability to access global resources. IiAS may also not support the (Re)appointment of directors where attendance levels have shored up only in the year of reappointment.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. IiAS recognizes the regulatory guidance that board meeting attendance is important: IiAS uses board meeting attendance as a measure of directors'

engagement with the company. While the regulation only articulates the final measure of removal for non-attendance over a 12-month period, IiAS believes that, from a governance standpoint, to perform their duties with sufficient care and diligence, board members must attend all board meetings. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

11. Appointment/ Re-appointment of Independent Directors

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 149 of the Companies Act, 2013, an independent director is permitted to be appointed for two consecutive terms of up to five years each. A mandatory cooling-off period of three years is necessary after ceasing as an independent director prior to any further reappointment - the provisions of the Act are applicable prospectively. Effective 1 January 2022, the appointment and reappointment of independent directors can be made only through a special resolution and the appointment should be approved by shareholders within 3-months from the date of appointment or at the ensuing general meeting, whichever is earlier. Additionally, in case of independent director appointments where the special resolution is not approved, the appointment shall still be made if, an ordinary resolution is passed and approval from majority of public shareholders is obtained.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting against the (re)appointment of independent directors in the following cases:

- Directors who have cross linkages with each other across multiple boards (board interlock)
- Those who do not satisfy the eligibility criteria laid down in Section 149(6) of the Act and Regulation (16)(1)(b) of the SEBI LODR
- Directors who have been on the board for more than 10 consecutive years, or whose tenure will cross 10 years during the proposed reappointment.
- Directors who have been on the board of the parent/holding/subsidiary for more than 10 consecutive years
- Former executive/non-executive directors who have not had a cooling-off period (complete detachment from the board, company, and promoter group) for at least three years
- Former executives who are on the board along with their previous supervisors unless these executives have completed at least a five-year cooling period. IiAS will consider the cooling period to have been completed only if there is a complete break-away between the director and the company/group
- Directors who are simultaneously on the board of a large number/percentage of group companies, with a prolonged tenure of >10 years in any of these companies
- Representatives of large shareholders (holding >2% stake) or lenders, even if they are not appointed on the board as a nominee. However, former employees of such shareholders who continue to remain on the board (even after they move on from their employment) may be considered independent. Similarly, directors who were earlier on the board as nominees may be considered independent once the investor has sold its stake. Retired IAS officers /civil servants will also be considered as independent on the board of Public Sector Enterprises
- Directors who have been on the board of at least two companies that have failed on account of poor governance and oversight. While this yardstick may not be always consistently applied – because the history of all directors may not be easily accessible, or we may fail to capture board failures, we believe investors must set higher thresholds for board accountability and begin giving some push back on the (re)appointment of such directors
- In unusual instances, where there has been severe regulatory action and / or significant shareholder wealth destruction, IiAS may consider not supporting the (re)appointment of directors - promoters, executive directors and non-executive directors - even for failure in a single instance, depending upon the gravity of the performance and / or governance failure.
- Where there are significant regulatory actions or litigations against a director – which may include investigations by government agencies. IiAS believe these may act as distractions for directors in

discharging their responsibilities towards the company. To this effect, IiAS will recommend that the director step down from the board position until the issues have been resolved and subsequently seek (re)appointment. Directors who may have business ties with the company, with their firms providing services to the company/group companies and/or the promoter group, irrespective of the extent of the pecuniary relationship

- In instances where IiAS believes that independent directors on board/board committees have not exercised balanced or prudent judgement
- The director carries a reputation risk or has been associated with transactions that IiAS considers to be prejudicial towards minority shareholders in either the company's or other boards or has strong political affiliations
- The director may have been accused (not necessarily convicted) of actions involving moral turpitude, or actions that may cause a reputation risk or damage – for the company and / or the director.

IiAS believes that shareholder approval for reappointments should be sought on or before the completion of a directors' first term as Independent Director; IiAS shall raise concerns where re-appointments are made after completion of the first term.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. Unlike the Act which computes tenure of independent directors beginning 1 April 2014, IiAS computes the tenure on a retrospective basis, i.e., from date of first appointment. Given that independent directors are entrusted with the role of enhancing and protecting the interests of public shareholders; IiAS focuses on the spirit of regulation in assessing the 'independence' of independent directors. IiAS believes that the length of tenure is directly proportional to the degree of independence of a director. IiAS does not favor past associations with the company/group companies (>10 years) and considers directors to be non-independent once they cross a tenure of 10 years from the date of their first appointment. Further, IiAS applies the 'visa rule' and considers independent directors seeking reappointment as non-independent if they complete a 10-year tenure within six months of the date of their next reappointment. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

12. Over boarding

Legal Requirement:

Sec 165 of the Companies Act, 2013, provides that the maximum number of companies in which a person can be appointed as a director should not exceed 20 (out of which not more than 10 should be public companies). Under Reg 17A of the SEBI LODR, a person should not serve as a director/independent director in more than 7 listed companies. If the director is a whole-time director/managing director in any listed company, then he/she cannot serve as an independent director in more than 3 listed companies.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will consider those holding full-time employment of any nature – including (but not limited to) consultants, partners of audit or law firms, company secretaries in practices, cost auditors - as whole-time directorship in terms of time commitments. Consequently, IiAS applies the same regulatory standards for assessing over-boarding among those who may not formally hold whole-time directorships but still shoulder comparable full-time responsibilities. Even so, to evaluate whether such directors can effectively fulfil their board duties, IiAS will review their attendance across all board positions. If it is determined that such directors have been unable to meet their responsibilities on any of their boards, IiAS may consider voting against their (re)appointment as an Independent Director across all their board engagements.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. IiAS believes that full-time employment responsibilities are equivalent to a whole-time directorship. Therefore, IiAS uses the same regulator yardstick to assess over-boarding for those who are not strictly considered whole-time directors. To assess whether

directors have sufficient time to devote to their board responsibilities, IiAS will assess if these directors are attending board meetings across all their board responsibilities.

13. Directors holding more than one executive position

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 203 of the Companies Act, 2013, whole-time key managerial personnel (Managing Director/ Wholetime Director/ Manager) shall not hold office in more than one company except in its subsidiary company at the same time. Under Reg 17A of the SEBI LODR, if the director is a whole-time director/managing director in any listed company, then he/she cannot serve as a director in more than 7 listed companies; as independent director in more than 3 listed companies.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will decide on such proposals on a case-to-case basis. IiAS makes a distinction between promoter executives and non-promoter executives in this case. The size and business linkages of the companies, as well as the remuneration being received from the companies where executive directorships are held are factored into the decision-making process.

- For promoter executives: Given their ownership over the group and level of accountability, IiAS recognizes the need for promoters to hold executive positions in two listed entities. IiAS' recommendation on the remuneration proposals from each of the entities will be based on whether the final pay (both at an individual company level and aggregate group level) fits in with the general IiAS criteria on executive remuneration – which includes a best fit comparison with size, performance, and peers.
- For non-promoter executives: IiAS does not encourage such directors to hold executive positions in more than one listed entity. IiAS will recommend voting for such proposals only if there is a parent-subsidary relationship between the entities and the total remuneration is in line with IiAS criteria on executive remuneration.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. While the regulations permit directors to hold two executive positions, IiAS opines that multiple executive positions may not allow directors to devote adequate time towards discharging their functions in each company effectively. Notwithstanding, promoter executives have responsibilities towards the group and are accountable for overall performance: therefore, IiAS understands the need to drive more than one company. For professional executives, IiAS believes their sole focus must be towards driving performance in one company. IiAS discourages multiple executive positions for professionals unless there is a parent-subsidary relationship between the companies and the aggregate remuneration is reasonable. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

14. Approve not filling casual vacancy on board

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 152 of the Companies Act, 2013, at every AGM, one-third of the directors (liable to retire by rotation), shall retire from office. At the AGM at which a director retires as aforesaid, the company may fill up the vacancy by appointing the retiring director or some other person in his/her place. If the vacancy of the retiring director is not so filled-up and the meeting has not expressly resolved not to fill the vacancy, the AGM shall stand adjourned till the same day in the next week, at the same time and place.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR not filling the vacancy caused due to retirement of a director. IiAS understands that if the resolution is defeated – the AGM stands adjourned: which poses its own set of challenges both for the investors and the company.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

15. Appointment/re-appointment of directors (executive/non-executive non-independent)

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 152 of the Companies Act, 2013, every director shall be appointed at a general meeting of the company. Effective 1 January 2022, companies (other than public sector companies) must ensure that shareholder approval for appointment or re-appointment of a director is taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment/reappointment – whichever is earlier. Additionally, a whole-time director/managing director whose (re)appointment was earlier rejected by shareholders, can be (re)appointed only with prior approval of shareholders.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting for the (re)appointment of directors unless:

- the director carries a reputation risk or has been associated with transactions that IiAS considers to be prejudicial towards minority shareholders or has strong political affiliations
- the director has been on the board of two or more companies that have failed on account of poor governance and oversight including promoter directors/representatives where company performance has been consistently deteriorating
- In unusual instances, where there has been severe regulatory action and / or significant shareholder wealth destruction, IiAS may consider not supporting the (re)appointment of directors - promoters, executive directors and non-executive directors - even for failure in a single instance, depending upon the gravity of the performance and / or governance failure.
- Where there are significant regulatory actions or litigations against a director – which may include investigations by government agencies. IiAS believe these may act as distractions for directors in discharging their responsibilities towards the company. To this effect, IiAS will recommend that the director step down from the board position until the issues have been resolved and subsequently seek (re)appointment.
- for the size of business, there are too many members of the promoter family on the board, which in turn, expands the board size beyond the median board size of the NIFTY 500
- For a non-executive director position, the director lacks adequate experience i.e., less than 10 years of relevant work-experience and / or is less than 30 years of age (IiAS will make exceptions to this rule when the director is a first-generation promoter or founder)
- For an executive director position, the director lacks adequate experience i.e., less than 10 years of relevant work-experience and / or is less than 35 years of age (IiAS will make exceptions to this rule when the director is a first-generation promoter or founder)
- the company has not provided any profile of the director nor is it possible to comprehensively gather the director's experience and qualifications from publicly available information
- Where the board is not compliant with regulatory requirements, or adding another executive or non-executive non-independent directors will make the board not compliant with regulatory requirements on board composition.
- in the case of a Chairperson Emeritus, the compensation paid to the Chairman Emeritus is high relative to what is paid to the whole-time directors, other directors, and / or KMPs or the remuneration has not been disclosed

IiAS believes that directors seeking appointment should have adequate competence, experience and skills in line with the nature and complexity of the business. Further, for shareholders to take an informed decision, details regarding the qualifications, experience and skills of directors should be clearly disclosed in the notice.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. While the regulations permit companies to decide upon directors being not liable to retire by rotation, IiAS does not favour permanent board

representation by virtue of non-retiring directorships, as this does not give shareholders the chance to vote on director (re)appointments. However, IiAS may make exceptions to this rule given the recent amendments to SEBI regulations requiring periodic shareholder approval for non-retiring directors. IiAS also believes that political affiliations may unnecessarily politicize decisions that the company will make, and therefore distract the management from its core focus. IiAS does not generally support multiple family members on the board and in the company, because this may limit the company's ability to attract the right professional talent. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

16. Removal of directors

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 169 of Companies Act, 2013, a company may, by ordinary resolution, remove a director. A special resolution will be required for removal of independent directors. Further, as per Reg 25(2A) of LODR, an independent director appointed via the dual mechanism (appointed by an ordinary resolution + majority of minority approval) can be removed only via such route.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on director removal on a case-to-case basis. IiAS may recommend voting for resolutions to remove directors, if these are supported by the board of directors and there is adequate disclosure on the rationale for the removal. If a resolution to remove a director is proposed by the company, IiAS expects the board to clearly articulate its rationale. The rationale must link the director removal with the long-term interest of the company. Further the director, whose removal is being proposed, must have the opportunity to present his/her arguments, if any, in favour of remaining on the board. This will allow shareholders to have a balanced view and make a more discerning voting decision.

IiAS may likely recommend voting against resolutions presented by controlling shareholders to remove independent directors, unless there are circumstances that may result in board dysfunction or have materially negative implications for the company. IiAS believes that the removal of independent directors by controlling shareholders may set the wrong precedent. Independent directors are responsible for protecting the interest of non-promoter shareholders, among their fiduciary responsibilities.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

17. Change in board size

Legal Requirement:

Sec 149(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, states that the board of every public company must comprise at least 3 and have a maximum of 15 directors. However, a company may appoint more than 15 directors after passing a special resolution. Under Reg 17 of the SEBI LODR, the board of top 2000 companies must have at least 6 directors.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting against resolutions regarding increase in board size to over 15 members, particularly if there are a disproportionate number of promoter family members on the board. However, in exceptional cases IiAS may vote for increasing the board size in companies facing financial/liquidity/stability/capital crisis and board expansion is necessary.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. While regulations prescribe the upper and lower limits for the size of the board, IiAS recognises that board size should be commensurate with the size and operations of the company. IiAS believes that, given the nature and quantum of work involved, 3 directors

may not be optimal. Its voting guidelines are therefore aligned to the Kotak Committee threshold of at least 6 directors. On the other hand, consensus on many critical issues may be difficult to achieve if board size exceeds 15 members. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

18. Remuneration to executive directors

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 197(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, the total managerial remuneration payable by a company in any financial year should not exceed 11% of the net profits of the company. Further, unless shareholder approval has been sought by a special resolution, the remuneration shall be limited to –

- 5% of net profits to any one Executive Director or 10% where there are more than one Executive Directors on the Board;
- 1% of the net profits to non-executive directors (where the Board consists of Executive directors), else 3% of the net profits.

Under Reg 17 of the SEBI LODR, shareholder approval is required if overall pay to all the executive promoter directors exceeds 5% of the net profit or if remuneration to a single promoter executive director exceeds Rs. 50 mn or 2.5% of the net profit, whichever is higher.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will use the following indicators to assess remuneration proposals:

- Size, turnover and profitability
- Market capitalisation and price performance
- Disclosures and clarity on pay structure, and on the performance metrics used to determine variable pay
- Alignment of pay with company performance
- Peer comparison
- Overall promoter/family remuneration
- Pay fairness (as compared to median employee remuneration)
- Fair value of options granted

IiAS believes that remuneration of executive directors should be used to align their focus with the company's goals and performance. Excessive remuneration, especially in non-performing companies, are a major cause of concern for stakeholders. To promote greater accountability and discipline, companies must ensure that the growth in remuneration for its executive director is in line with growth in profits and revenues. IiAS further believes that to align pay and performance, the remuneration structure of executive directors must have a larger component of variable pay which must comprise a balance of both short term and long-term incentives. Additionally, IiAS expects the NRCs to disclose the performance metrics used to benchmark variable pay, to provide greater clarity to shareholders. IiAS may raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided by the company on such resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

19. Minimum remuneration/Waiver of excess remuneration – Executive directors

Legal Requirement:

As per Schedule V of the Companies Act, 2013, where in any financial year during the currency of tenure of a managerial person, a company has no profits or its profits are inadequate, it may, pay remuneration to the managerial person not exceeding, the following limits:-

<i>Where the effective capital is</i>	<i>Limit of yearly remuneration payable shall not exceed</i>
(i) Negative or less than 5 crores	Rs. 60 Lakhs
(ii) 5 crores and above but less than 100 crores	Rs. 84 Lakhs
(iii) 100 crores and above but less than 250 crores	Rs. 120 Lakhs
(iv) 250 crores and above	Rs. 120 lakhs plus 0.01% of the effective capital in excess of Rs. 250 crores:

The company may pay remuneration over the ceiling limit specified in Schedule V, if members' approval by way of a Special Resolution has been taken for payment of minimum remuneration for a period not exceeding 3 years.

If any director receives, directly or indirectly remuneration in excess of the limit prescribed or without shareholder approval, he/she shall refund such sums to the company, within two years or such lesser period as may be allowed by the company unless shareholders consent to waiver of remuneration by a special resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will evaluate past performance and profitability before recommending voting for minimum remuneration/waiver of excess remuneration. IiAS may recommend voting 'for' if there is reason to believe that the executive director will play an important role to help turn around the company. IiAS believes that the minimum remuneration paid to executive directors must be in line with peers and must not be higher than the remuneration paid during years in which the company made adequate profits. Further, if approval is sought for waiver of excess remuneration, the waiver sought must be reasonable and overall remuneration (including excess remuneration) must be in line with the size and complexity of the company. IiAS may make a distinction on minimum remuneration/waiver of excess remuneration for promoters vis-à-vis professional executives.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

20. Remuneration to Non-executive directors

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 197 of the Companies Act, 2013, non-executive directors can be paid commission/remuneration up to 1% of the net profits of the company (if there is a managing or whole-time director or manager) and 3% otherwise, by passing an ordinary resolution. These limits can be extended on obtaining approval of the shareholders by a special resolution. Under SEBI LODR, the board of directors shall recommend all fees or compensation, if any, paid to non-executive directors, including independent directors and shall require approval of shareholders in general meeting.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on this resolution on a case-to-case basis after factoring in the following:

- Whether an overall cap has been specified recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS' voting recommendation will be based on a combination of the following factors:
- Remuneration paid to non-executive directors in past years
- Whether the proposed remuneration is commensurate with the size and scale of the company

- Remuneration paid to one director relative to remuneration paid to other non-executive directors
- Whether aggregate remuneration is higher than or largely in line with that of any other executive director
- Whether the nature of remuneration is fixed or variable (commission-based)
- Whether there has been a linkage of non-executive director remuneration to company performance
- Overall family remuneration (for promoter family members)

IiAS opines that since the regulatory thresholds are based on profits - for larger companies, 1% of profits can be a large amount. Companies should therefore be encouraged to place a cap on the amount proposed to be paid, rather than stay with the regulatory thresholds. Additionally, IiAS does not encourage resolutions seeking shareholder approval in perpetuity and may raise concerns on open-ended resolutions. IiAS may also raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided by the company on such resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

21. Remuneration exceeding 50% of total non-executive directors' remuneration

Legal Requirement:

As per SEBI LODR, approval of shareholders must be obtained every year via a special resolution where the annual remuneration for a single non-executive director exceeds 50% of the total remuneration to all non-executive directors.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. In companies with professionals as CEO, promoter directors can have a material role to play in establishing strategic direction and governance structures – even while being appointed in a non-executive capacity. In such cases, where accountability and control can be linked to one non-executive promoter director, IiAS will consider the individual to be part of the leadership team and review the remuneration proposal from that perspective (see IiAS' voting guidelines on executive remuneration).

For non-promoter non-executive directors: Pay structures, which make their roles appear more executive in nature or where the remuneration is higher than the senior leadership, may have material implications for the chain of command within and outside the organization. In such circumstances, IiAS will generally not support the remuneration of the director.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

22. Alteration to Memorandum of Association (MoA)

Legal Requirement:

The Memorandum of Association (MoA) of a company states the name of company, state in which the registered office is to be situated, objects for which the company is incorporated, liability of members – whether limited or unlimited and share capital of the company. Under Sec 13 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company may alter the provisions of its MoA by obtaining shareholder approval through a special resolution; for change in capital clause an ordinary resolution would suffice.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR resolutions seeking to amend the clauses in a company's MoA. IiAS believes that companies may require alteration to the MoA in most cases for operational reasons. Such alterations are generally not prejudicial to the interest of minority shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

23. Alteration of Objects clause

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 13 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company, which has raised money from public through prospectus and still has any unutilized amount out of the money so raised, shall not change its objects for which it raised the money unless a special resolution is passed by the company. In such cases, the dissenting shareholders (i.e., not less than 10% of the shareholders who voted on the resolution in the general meeting) shall be given an opportunity to exit by the promoters and shareholders having control in accordance with the regulations specified under SEBI ICDR.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR changes to the Objects Clause in the MoA. IiAS believes that it is the board's and management's prerogative to decide on business diversifications. Such alterations are generally not prejudicial to the interest of minority shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

24. Shifting of registered office

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 13 of the Companies Act, 2013, approval of shareholders and the Central Government shall be required for alteration of the memorandum relating to shifting the place of the registered office from one State to another. The Act requires companies to hold their general meetings in the city/ town/village of the registered office.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS believes that companies should be more accessible to its shareholders and other stakeholders to facilitate shareholder engagement with company management. IiAS does not favour proposals to shift the registered office if there is reason to believe that the shifting will cause significant inconvenience to shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

25. Alteration to share capital

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 61 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company may subject to shareholder approval, alter its capital by (a) increasing its authorised share capital; (b) consolidate and divide all or any of its share capital into shares of a larger amount; (c) convert all or any of its fully paid-up shares into stock and vice versa; (d) subdividing its shares, or any of them, into shares of smaller amount; (e) cancelling shares which have not been taken or agreed to be taken by any person.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR resolutions proposing to increase/decrease the authorized share capital. IiAS believes that increase in authorised share capital will enable a company to raise further capital to pursue potential investment opportunities, if they arise. IiAS understands that subdivision of shares is generally expected to increase the liquidity and make the equity shares of the company more affordable to the small investors and thus is generally in favour of such resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

26. Alteration to Articles of Association (AoA)

Legal Requirement:

The Articles of Association (AoA) of a company contains regulations for management of the company. Under Sec 14 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company may alter the provisions of its AoA only by obtaining shareholder approval by a special resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on resolutions seeking alteration of the AoA on a case-to-case basis.

IiAS will look out for the following clauses in the AoA:

- Board nomination rights, except where such rights are based on shareholding/ownership thresholds subject to a minimum shareholding threshold of at least 10% to be able to nominate a director on the board
- Continuation of board nomination rights even with less than 10% shareholding; IiAS will generally not support such clauses, but may make context-based exceptions
- Committee nomination rights or quorum related rights to investors, irrespective of an embedded minimum shareholding threshold
- Non-rotational board seats, especially in case of promoter directors; IiAS may make carve-outs to this in line with the amended SEBI regulations which require periodic shareholder approval for such directors w.e.f 1 April 2024
- Appointment of permanent Managing Director/Whole-time Director
- Requirement of specific individual(s) to form quorum for board/committee or general meetings
- Veto power on board decisions
- Inclusion of clauses forming a part of investor/shareholder agreements
- Right to appoint risk head, internal or statutory auditors
- Powers to arrange security at meetings

IiAS believes that the charter documents of a company must ensure that all shareholders can only exercise such degree of control and influence which is proportionate to their equity ownership in the company. In principle, IiAS does not approve of any clauses or changes in the AoA which provide special/overriding powers to a particular individual/group, which are susceptible to potential misuse and/or are prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders. IiAS expects the company to highlight the changes in the shareholder

notice including making the draft AoA available on its website and may raise concerns where adequate information is not provided.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

27. Charge for sending documents through a particular mode to shareholders

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 20 of the Companies Act, 2013, a document may be served to a shareholder by sending it to him/her by post, registered post, speed post, courier, or by such electronic or other mode. The Act further mentions that if a shareholder chooses a specific mode of delivery for the desired documents – other than the delivery mode opted by the company – he/she will have to pay such fees as may be determined by the company in its general meeting. Such a provision is either embedded as part of the AoA or put up as a separate resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such resolutions. While IiAS believes charging fees would make shareholders reluctant in seeking information from the company; companies have informed IiAS, that this is a tool used by some disruptive retail shareholders to create inconveniences.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

28. Issuance of equity shares/ Preferential issue of shares

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 62 of the Companies Act, 2013, issuance of shares on a pro-rata basis to existing shareholders (rights issue) will not require shareholder approval. However, if the issuance is to any other person/entity other than the existing shareholders, it requires approval through a special resolution. This includes both public issues (IPO/FPO) and preferential allotments.

Preferential issues are governed by SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018. Preferential issues are made to select investors and can be completed within shorter timeframes. A company is required to make adequate disclosures on the utilisation of funds raised through qualified institutional placement/preferential issuance. Such approvals are valid for a period of one year from the date of passing the resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis based on the mode of the issue. IiAS will generally recommend voting for preferential issues. The analysis will consider the following:

- List of allottees: promoter/non-promoter
- Type of investor: financial/strategic
- Extent of dilution
- Urgency of funds
- Debt levels and available cash
- Return on capital employed

IiAS will also recommend voting for preferential issues for companies in the financial services sector, as these companies need additional capital to meet Basel III guidelines, absorb credit losses, and to grow.

IiAS believes that companies need growth capital. However, while IiAS recognizes that a public issue is typically costlier and time consuming, IiAS views excessive dilution of existing shareholders by the promoter

group as a concern unless companies are undergoing a debt restructuring program or are in urgent need of funds.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

29. Issue of Warrants

Legal Requirement:

Such issues are governed by SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018. In a warrants issue, at least 25% of the conversion price is paid up to front, with an option convert the warrants into equity shares anytime during the next 18 months. The remaining amount is paid upon conversion. If the warrants are allowed to lapse, the initial upfront amount is forfeited by the warrant holders.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS is generally not in favour of preferential issue of warrants to promoters because of the risk of forfeiture. IiAS does not encourage warrants to promoters and rather all the money be brought-in upfront. But IiAS may recommend voting for preferential warrants if these are:

- Made to a government-controlled entity (in case of PSUs)
- Made to technical collaborators, wherein the preferential allotment may be required to bring in technical expertise
- Made to non-promoter shareholders
- In which the exercise period is less than 18 months
- In which the upfront payment is greater than 25%
- Where the warrants are issued at a significant premium to the market price
- Company confirms that the allottee will pay the remaining amount irrespective of the market price prevailing on the date of exercise of warrants.
- Where the company's financial health is deteriorating and there is a need for urgent fund infusion
- Where the company offers the same terms of issue to both promoters and non-promoter shareholders
- Granted to an institution or listed company
- The company has a capex plan that requires staggered funding
- The promoters have a track record of completely subscribing to warrant issues in the past

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

30. Variation of shareholder rights

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 48 of the Companies Act, 2013, the voting rights attached to any class of shares may be varied with the consent of three fourths of holders of the shares of that class or by passing a special resolution at a separate meeting of the holders of the shares of that class and the issue of such shares is further authorised by an ordinary resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting AGAINST any proposal for variation of voting rights.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. While permitted under regulation, IiAS believes that, in the interest of shareholder democracy, one share should equal one vote.

31. Delisting of equity shares (from all the recognised stock exchanges)

Legal Requirement:

As per the SEBI (Delisting of Equity shares) Regulations, 2021, a company may voluntarily delist its equity shares from the stock exchanges where they are listed, if the acquirers provide an exit opportunity to the public shareholders of the company in accordance with the requirements of the SEBI Delisting Regulations. The procedure to be followed is: (i) acquirer to make a public announcement of the delisting offer; (ii) company to obtain the approval of its Board of Directors in respect of the proposal of the acquirer after carrying out the prescribed due diligence; (iii) company to obtain the approval of the shareholders through postal ballot and/or e-voting via a special resolution, within 45 days from obtaining board approval - the delisting resolution will be acted upon only if the votes cast by the public shareholders in favour of the resolution are at least two times the number of votes cast against it; (iv) company to seek in-principle approval of the stock exchange(s).

The acquirer may (i) accept at its sole discretion, to acquire the equity shares of the public shareholders at either (a) the discovered price determined in accordance with the reverse book building mechanism specified in the SEBI Delisting Regulations or (b) an exit price, which is higher than the floor price or (c) may, if it chooses to, provide an indicative price in respect of the delisting offer, which shall be higher than the floor price – acquirer shall also have the option to revise the indicative price upwards before the start of the bidding period. The acquirer may, if it deems fit, pay a price higher than the discovered price. Further, in case the discovered price is not acceptable to the acquirer, a counter offer may be made by the acquirer to the public shareholders. The delisting proposal will be successful only if the collective shareholding of the acquirer and the tendered equity shares accepted through eligible bids at the discovered price/exit price reaches 90% of the total issued equity share capital.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR delisting proposals that are compliant with regulations unless they are detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders. IiAS believes companies and promoters can choose to delist their shares at any point time. The legal framework provides sufficient safeguards for minority shareholders including mandating a price-discovery mechanism (reverse book-building process) to decide on the final price.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

32. Delisting from any one stock exchange

Legal Requirement:

As per the SEBI (Delisting of Equity shares) Regulations, 2021, a company may delist its equity shares from one or more of the recognised stock exchanges on which it is listed without providing an exit opportunity to the public shareholders, if after the proposed delisting, the equity shares remain listed on any recognised stock exchange that has nationwide trading terminals. In this regard, the Delisting Regulations require the acquirer to (i) seek Board approval; (ii) make an application to the relevant stock exchange(s); (iii) issue a public notice of the proposed delisting mentioning the name(s) of the stock exchange(s) from which the equity shares of the company are intended to be delisted, reasons for delisting, the fact of continuation of listing on other stock exchange(s) and (iv) disclose the fact of delisting in its first annual report post delisting.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR delisting proposals that are compliant with regulations unless they are detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders. IiAS believes companies and promoters can choose

to delist their shares at any point time. The legal framework provides sufficient safeguards for minority shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

33. Issuance/Ratification of ESOP schemes

Legal Requirement:

ESOP schemes are governed by the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021 in addition to the Companies Act, 2013. As per the regulations, companies can introduce new ESOP schemes and modify existing ESOP schemes by obtaining shareholder approval via a special resolution. Under Regulation 12, no company shall make any fresh grant which involves allotment or transfer of shares to its employees under any scheme formulated prior to its IPO and prior to the listing of its equity shares ('pre-IPO scheme') unless: (i) Such pre-IPO scheme is in conformity with the SEBI regulations; and (ii) Such pre-IPO scheme is ratified by its shareholders subsequent to the IPO, which may be done any time prior to grant of new options or shares or SAR under the pre-IPO scheme.

IiAS' stance:

- We recognize that companies view share-based compensation as deferred compensation and a retention tool, nevertheless, our vantage point is that of investors: therefore, there is a difference in our approach to share-based compensation. The underlying principle of our voting recommendations on share-based compensation is the alignment of employee interests with that of shareholder interests. Share-based compensation schemes are essential 'pay-at-risk' schemes and therefore we believe these schemes must not provide a down-side risk protection to employees, since this is not afforded to shareholders. In our assessment, the alignment of interests is best when the exercise price is the market price (or a function of the market price) on the date of grant. Where the exercise price is at a significant discount to market price (generally of more than 20%), we expect vesting of stock-based grants to be based on certain pre-defined performance targets that must be disclosed.
- Where stock-option grants are at discount to market price, and vesting is performance-based, we expect companies to either:
 - a) disclose specific corporate-level targets, along with an indicative range of weightages for each of the parameters. Generic disclosures on performance targets such as revenues and EBITDA or stating that it will be a combination of corporate and individual goals, will not be sufficient. OR
 - b) In case the company chooses not to disclose these corporate-level targets at the time of proposing the resolution, IiAS will expect companies to disclose, in the subsequent annual reports, the basis of vesting of these deeply discounted stock options with specific disclosures on the corporate-level performance parameters, the target achievement on these performance parameters, and the achievement during the year, basis which the vesting of stock options was allowed. The company must clearly articulate its intention to disclose this information in subsequent annual reports, in the shareholder notice/resolution or in a filing on the stock exchanges.
- In addition to exercise price, IiAS' assessment of share-based compensation includes an assessment of dilution, exercise period and vesting period. IiAS expects the dilution to be restricted to less than 5%. We generally support a staggered vesting schedule and overall vesting periods to be between one to five years. Exercise period should not stretch to more than five years from date of vesting.
- IiAS will generally not support schemes that carry share-price-based performance measures (including, but not limited to, market capitalization levels, total shareholder returns, and targeted share price), unless the company has disclosed the listed peers or the index against which the company's share-price-based performance will be measured. This is largely because such achievements may be a culmination of several market level issues and is not singularly limited to the company performance. Therefore, a relative

share-price-based performance, as measured against peers or an index, is more likely to reflect the performance of the company, independent of macro variables.

- IiAS expects share-based schemes to be well-distributed within the employee pool. Therefore, we may not support ESOP schemes where the distribution of the majority options is largely to senior management (board and one level below board) or formulated to reward one single employee. IiAS may also not support ESOP schemes where the majority of the RSUs are granted to senior management and stock options are granted to other employees.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS supports issuance of ESOP's/RSU's as these become a crucial element of long-term variable pay in executive remuneration structures. In assessing stock options, IiAS evaluates if there is an alignment of interests between investors and employees. To this extent, we expect stock options to be at market price or at a token discount (of upto 20% of the market price). Where these are issues at higher discount, we expect the vesting to be performance based and the performance benchmarks to be disclosed. This helps investors make an informed decision on whether the proposed scheme is in the long-term interest of all stakeholders. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

34. ESOPs to listed holding/subsidiary and associate companies

Legal Requirement:

Under SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021, approval of shareholders by way of a separate resolution in the general meeting shall be obtained by the company in case of extending ESOP schemes to employees of holding subsidiary, or associate companies.

IiAS' stance:

- IiAS will not support the extension of stock option schemes to employees of subsidiary, holding or other group companies that are listed or expected to be listed in the next 12 months. Such an extension could lead to employees receiving remuneration from multiple entities, potentially creating conflicts of interest and dividing their loyalties.
- In case the company propose to extend the share-based compensation scheme to employees of the group and / or associate companies, IiAS expects disclosure on the companies to which the scheme will extend, and the rationale for the same. This expectation of disclosure is not applicable in case the scheme is being extended to subsidiaries.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. IiAS will support the extension of stock options schemes to employees of unlisted holding company and subsidiaries. While permitted under regulation, IiAS does not encourage the practice of extending ESOP schemes to listed holding/ subsidiary companies. Listed holding companies generally have their own ESOP schemes. In case of extension of schemes to subsidiary companies, the costs associated with the scheme will have to be borne by subsidiary company while the benefits will accrue to employees of the holding company. In case of extending the scheme to employees of associate companies, the board must provide a clear rationale for the same and the list of companies it proposes to extend the scheme to. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

35. Modification/Variation to ESOP Schemes

Legal Requirement:

Under SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021, a company may by special resolution in a general meeting vary the terms of the schemes offered pursuant to an earlier resolution of the general body but not yet exercised by the employee provided such variation is not prejudicial to the interests of the employees.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. Amendments to existing stock option schemes will be reviewed as per following:

- Modification of exercise price - IiAS is not in favour of re-pricing stock options and will generally recommend voting against unless:
 - executive directors and senior management are excluded from the new re-priced scheme
 - the reasons for the poor performance have been beyond the control of the company
 - the re-priced options follow a life cycle like that of new stock options, i.e., they have a specified vesting, grant and exercise schedule
 - the change is driven by regulatory compliance
- Modification of vesting period/exercise period - IiAS will take a case-to-case view on the revision in exercise period and expects the companies to provide a detailed rationale for revision in exercise period
- Increase in size of stock option scheme - Some companies propose to add to the pool of stock options in the existing schemes. In such cases, IiAS will treat and evaluate it as a fresh stock option plan

ESOPs are 'pay at risk' options that employees accept at the time of the grant. The inherent assumption of an ESOP scheme is that there could be possible downside risks – and that employees may not indeed gain from a stock price movement. By repricing companies seek to protect employees' downside risk and ensure that they gain on the upside. Notwithstanding, in case of material events beyond the company's control, IiAS recognizes the need to grant companies flexibility towards repricing of granted options.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

36. Issue of stock options exceeding 1% of issued capital

Legal Requirement:

Under SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits and Sweat Equity) Regulations, 2021, approval of shareholders by way of a separate resolution in the general meeting shall be obtained by the company in case of grant of stock options to identified employees, during any one year, equal to or exceeding 1% of the issued capital (excluding outstanding warrants and conversions) of the company at the time of grant of such options.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will take a case-to-case view on such grants to employees in excess of these thresholds. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such resolutions if the employees to be granted stock options of more than 1% of the issued capital have been clearly identified and their overall remuneration levels (inclusive of fair value of stock options) is reasonable. IiAS does not support a high degree of concentration of stock options if remuneration levels for the executive are already high or inclusion of the stock options will increase remuneration to high levels. IiAS recognises that the contribution and the expectation of senior leadership to drive performance. However, the overall remuneration levels of executives must be taken into consideration before excess stock options can be granted.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

37. Increase in borrowing limits

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 180(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, a company needs prior shareholder approval through a special resolution to raise debt more than the aggregate of its paid-up share capital and free reserves and securities premium account. Temporary loans obtained from the company's bankers in the ordinary course of business are exempt from this section: therefore, the applicability of this section (and the consequent shareholder approval) is largely limited to raising long term funds.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR, under the following circumstances:

- for manufacturing and services companies, where the increase in debt has been clearly explained and ties in with a case for business expansion, or where the increase in debt has no material implications for the overall credit protection measures
- IiAS may consider using publicly available credit ratings provided by credit rating agencies as a measure to assess the company's level of creditworthiness
- for financial services companies, where the capital adequacy levels are within the levels stipulated by RBI's BASEL III capital regulations

IiAS may recommend voting AGAINST an increase in the borrowing limits where:

- the company has borrowed excessively in the past and/or has a poor track record in fulfilling its debt obligations
- there is no clear rationale for increasing the borrowing limit – and where, if the company raises debt to the full extent of the limit, its credit protection measures (Debt/EBITDA and/or Debt: Equity) will deteriorate significantly from current levels
- borrowing limit is a rolling limit linked to net-worth

IiAS believes that while companies do need some flexibility to raise funds to manage their operations, some companies ask shareholders to approve borrowing limits that the company is unlikely to use even in the foreseeable future. Others have asked for rolling limits - a finite amount of debt, over and above the net-worth - as the company's net-worth increases, so does its borrowing limits. Therefore, borrowing limits must be sought at judicious levels.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

38. Fixed deposits from members/public

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 73 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company can accept or renew deposits up to 10% of aggregate of the paid-up capital, free reserve and securities premium account from its shareholders and up to 25% of aggregate of the paid-up capital, free reserve and securities premium account from the public. The company is additionally required to obtain credit rating (which must not be below the investment grade rating) from a recognised credit rating agency each year during the tenure of the deposits.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will support fixed deposit programmes that have credit ratings in the higher investment grade (BBB+ and above for the FD programme), since instruments with these credit ratings are expected to have a lower probability of default. IiAS may not support fixed deposit programmes if it believes retail investors carry a

significant risk in investing in such programmes. IiAS expects that the deposit programmes carry interest which is aligned to the credit risk of the company.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

39. Creation of charge on company's assets

Legal Requirement:

Companies need to seek approval of shareholders by way of special resolution for creation of charge on their assets to ratify security creation on funds already borrowed in the past or for securing their future borrowings under Sec 180(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting for such resolutions. IiAS believes that the terms of borrowing, interest rates etc. for secured loans tend to be better than those for unsecured loans. IiAS may not support resolutions that enable assets to be pledged against debt raised by third parties, associates or promoter-controlled entities.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

40. Issue of NCDs/ debt instruments on private placement basis

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 42 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company requires shareholder approval through a special resolution if debt securities are offered on a private placement basis. Where the proposed amount to be raised through such offer or invitation exceeds company's borrowing limits, it shall be sufficient if the company passes a previous special resolution only once in a year for all the offers or invitations for such debentures during the year.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting for such resolutions unless not within borrowing limits of the company. IiAS understands that non-convertible securities/debt instruments (debentures) are used by companies to augment their capital base.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

41. Issue of preference shares

Legal Requirement:

An issue of preference shares has to be authorized by passing a special resolution in the general meeting of the company as per Section 55 of the Companies Act, 2013. As per regulations, preference shareholders do not have voting rights. They can only vote on resolutions which directly affect the rights attached to the preference shares and, any resolution for the winding up of the company or for the repayment or reduction of the share capital of the company. However, in cases where the dividend in respect of a class of preference shares has not been paid for a period of two years or more, such class of preference shareholders gets a right to vote on all resolutions placed before the company.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS recognizes that preference shares are an additional mechanism of raising capital for companies and will generally support such resolutions. IiAS may not support preference share issuances if it believes retail investors carry a risk in investing in such instrument.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

42. Inter-corporate transactions

Legal Requirement:

Inter-corporate transactions can be clubbed into the following categories: loans, corporate guarantees or loan securities, and investments. Under Sec 186 of the Companies Act, 2013, when the aggregate of the loan, investment, guarantee or security already made together with the loan, investment, guarantee or security proposed to be made exceeds the higher of – 60% of (paid-up share capital + free reserves + securities premium) or 100% of (free reserves + securities premium), prior approval by means of a special resolution is necessary.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS believes that inter-corporate transactions provide operational flexibility to companies. However, these transactions may carry a risk of potential misuse. IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS voting recommendations on such cases are based on the following:

- disclosure levels: mostly about the recipient parties
- headroom available under current limits
- affiliation of recipient party with promoter group
- financial health of the company extending loans
- financial health of the recipient parties, including cases where it is a part of an approved rehabilitation proposal
- source of funds for the transactions
- aggregate amount of transaction
- urgency and need for such transactions

Companies must have an absolute limit on inter-corporate transactions. IiAS will vote AGAINST resolutions where inter-corporate transactions have rolling limits. IiAS may raise concerns in the absence of clarity on the transactions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

43. Loans to companies in which directors are interested (Sec 185)

Legal Requirement:

Sec 185 of Companies Act, 2013, prohibits any company from giving loans, guarantee or securities in favor of (a) its directors or directors of the holding company; (b) any partner or relative of such director; (c) any firm in which such director/relative is a partner or (d) to any other person in whom the director is interested; subject to the following conditions –

- Shareholder approval is sought through a special resolution at a general meeting and full disclosure of the same is provided in the explanatory statement
- the loans are utilized by the borrowing company for its principal business activities.

These conditions do not apply to,

1. the giving of any loan to a managing or whole-time director - as a part of the conditions of service extended by the company to all its employees or pursuant to any scheme approved by the members by a special resolution
2. a company which in the ordinary course of its business provides loans or gives guarantees or securities for the due repayment of any loan
3. any loan made by a holding company to its wholly owned subsidiary company or any guarantee given or security provided by a holding company in respect of any loan made to its wholly owned subsidiary company
4. any guarantee given or security provided by a holding company in respect of loan made by any bank or financial institution to its subsidiary company.

"Person in whom a director is interested" means any private company in which such director is a director or member; anybody corporate in which not less than 25% of the total voting power may be exercised or controlled by any such director(s) or whose Board is accustomed to act in accordance with the directions or instructions of the Board, or of any director(s), of the lending company.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS voting recommendations on such cases are based on the following:

- The company has provided a strategic rationale nor an economic rationale to support its subsidiaries/joint venture
- Details on whether the loans provided will be to the extent of the company's shareholding and if the transactions will be at arm's length pricing
- The company has disclosed the full terms of transactions including interest and the repayment period

In IiAS' view, transactions with companies with common directorships pose inherent conflicts of interest and may be used to the detriment of minority shareholders. A clear and granular articulation of the need for such transactions, details of pricing and full disclosure of the terms of the transactions will be factored into IiAS' decision on such resolutions. In the absence of clarity on the transactions, IiAS will vote against such resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

44. Office of profit

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 188 of the Companies Act, 2013, a related party's appointment to any office or place of profit in the company, its subsidiary or associate carrying monthly remuneration exceeding Rs. 0.25 mn should be approved by the shareholders of the company. This requirement will not apply to any transactions entered into by the company in its ordinary course of business other than transactions which are not on an arm's length basis.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS' recommendation will depend on:

- The appointee's qualifications and experience – both within and outside the company
- proposed pay structure
- the comparability of remuneration across peers
- the definition of the peer group based on experience, skill, and remuneration levels

Persons in office of profit positions should be compensated in line with their experience levels and responsibilities in the business. IiAS expects companies to ask for shareholder approval for the office of

profit position for a defined period of time which allows shareholders to periodically revisit such appointments and remuneration levels; but not more than three years– IiAS is unlikely to support open-ended resolutions. Also, IiAS may not support the appointments, if there are too many family members being inducted in similar roles across the company.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

45. Related Party transactions

Legal Requirement:

- The Companies Act 2013, under Section 188 defines different materiality thresholds depending on the nature of the transaction for obtaining shareholder approval. Any related party transaction which is not in ordinary course of business and not at arm's length will require shareholder approval.
- As per SEBI LODR, prior approval of shareholders via an ordinary resolution will be required for: (a) all material RPTs, i.e., transfer of resources exceeding Rs. 1000 crores or 10% of the annual consolidated turnover – lower of the two; (b) subsequent material modifications; (c) material RPTs between a company or any of its subsidiaries with a related party of the company/any of its subsidiaries; (d) material RPTs between the company or any of its subsidiaries with any other person/entity, the purpose and effect of which is to benefit a related party of the company or any of its subsidiaries. Preferential issues, corporate actions viz., payment of dividend, subdivision/consolidation of securities, rights issue or bonus issue, buy-back of securities and acceptance of fixed deposits by banks/NBFCs at terms uniformly applicable/offered to all shareholders/public will not be considered as RPTs.
- Interested/related parties can abstain from voting or vote against such resolutions.
- Transactions (a) with wholly owned subsidiaries; (b) between Government-owned entities and (c) between wholly-owned subsidiaries of a listed holding company are exempt from shareholder approval.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR transactions that are operational in nature.

IiAS will generally recommend voting against related party transactions if-

- the controlling shareholder unduly benefits from the transaction
- it cannot be ascertained that the transaction is at arms-length
- the approval sought is for an indefinite amount or for an undefined time period: IiAS expects resolutions to have time validity, preferably of not more than five years. IiAS however recognizes that companies enter into transactions which by their very nature, might be of longer duration, an example being service concession agreements, sale and leaseback transactions, power purchase agreements. We recognize that some of these contracts can extend to a 20+ year period. IiAS will support these transactions if the company can establish a clear business imperative. In such instances, IiAS expects companies to disclose the contours of such contracts, including the indicative value during the life of the contract and the annual value.

For all related party transactions (whether annual contracts or long-term contracts), IiAS expects companies to disclose the ultimate ownership of the related party with which the company seeks to undertake these transactions. In assessing these transactions, IiAS will question the underlying rationale for the transaction. This will include raising questions on the business structure. IiAS will generally not support arrangements where promoter-controlled business is running allied or adjacent businesses that are primarily dependent on the listed company.

IiAS believes that related party transactions must be conducted in a manner that protects the interests of minority shareholders. For this, board must ensure that all aspects of such related party transactions are fully disclosed, including details on its nature, frequency, materiality, quantum and pricing terms: IiAS may raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided in the shareholder notice. IiAS understands that there are

inherent conflicts of interest involved in related party transactions, which must be adequately managed, with comprehensive policies, and accurate monitoring and disclosure.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

46. Royalty payments

Legal Requirement:

Under the SEBI LODR, shareholders' approval is required for royalty/brand payments to related parties exceeding 5% of consolidated turnover of the company as per the last audited financials.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on the payment of royalty based on an analysis of the following general principles:

- Should the company be paying royalty in the first place?
- Does the market see value in the brand/technology?
- How has the quantum of royalty been decided and has an independent evaluation been conducted?
- What has been the track record on royalty pay-outs, and has it been aligned with performance?

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR royalty payments within these thresholds, provided that royalty has grown in line with performance. IiAS believes that while royalty payments are a legitimate payout, they must be proportionate to the benefits derived by the company. In IiAS' opinion, the increase in royalty must be in line with the improvement in the performance of the company.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

47. Charitable donations

Legal Requirement:

Section 181 of the Companies Act, 2013, allows companies to make charitable contributions up to 5% of the average net profits for the three immediately preceding financial years. Shareholder approval via an ordinary resolution is required for contributions to exceed the 5% threshold.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting AGAINST charitable donations beyond 5% of average net profits. IiAS may make an exception to this policy if profits have dipped during the year due to one-time expenses or other exceptional items. In such cases, IiAS expects the company to seek approval only for the specific year in which the profits dipped. Further, IiAS does not favour approvals where there is any association between the recipient charities and the company management/board/ members of the promoter family.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. IiAS understands that companies can spend 5% of an average of three-year profits in charitable contributions without shareholder approval. Over and above this, companies are required to spend 2% of average of three-year profits in CSR, which has philanthropic aspects. This resolution in effect is seeking shareholder approval when the spend is more than 7% of the average net profits for the three immediately preceding financial years on charitable / non-business-related aspects. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

48. Sale of Assets / Slump sale

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 180(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013, a company cannot sell, lease, or dispose of any of its undertaking, or substantially the whole of any undertaking, without getting prior approval from shareholders through a special resolution. SEBI regulations now require the proposal to be additionally approved by majority of public/minority shareholders.

Under Regulation 24(5) of the SEBI LODR, a company cannot dispose of shares in its material subsidiary which would reduce its shareholding (either on its own or together with other subsidiaries) to less than or equal to 50% or cease the exercise of control over the subsidiary without passing a special resolution. Further, as per Regulation 24(6) selling, disposing and leasing of assets amounting to more than 20% of the assets of the material subsidiary on an aggregate basis during a financial year shall require prior approval of shareholders by way of special resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS expects the companies to make the following disclosures:

- Rationale for the sale
- Financials of the business being sold
- Critical balance sheet and P&L ratios of the business being sold
- Expected impact on sales/profits
- Use of sale proceeds
- Book value of aggregate assets to be disposed
- Market value of aggregate assets to be disposed
- Valuation report from an independent third-party
- Expected price

Given that slump sales envisage disposal of a significant portion of a company's existing business, these may have a material impact on the financials of the company. Therefore, details of the proposed transaction, including the strategic rationale, financial impact and valuation metrics are critical to shareholders in order to take an informed view. Further, the use of the sales proceeds must be disclosed to shareholders to ensure equitable distribution of such proceeds. IiAS will generally recommend voting for the resolution if it believes that the transaction is not detrimental to the interests of the minority shareholders. IiAS may raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided in the notice.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

49. Reclassification of promoters

Legal Requirement:

Reg 31A of the SEBI LODR requires shareholders to approve proposals for promoter re-classification.

Reclassification of promoters is permitted under the following conditions:

1. promoters seeking re-classification should make a request to the company
2. the Board must analyse such a request and place it before the shareholders along with the Board's view on the same
3. company should obtain shareholder approval in a general meeting where the promoters seeking re-classification and persons related thereto shall not vote to approve such resolution
4. promoter along with persons related thereto should:
 - not hold more than 10% of the voting rights in the company
 - not directly or indirectly, exercise control, over the affairs of the entity

- not have special rights under any formal/informal arrangements
 - not be represented on the Board (including having a nominee director)
 - not act as KMP in the company
 - not be categorised as a “wilful defaulter” under RBI guidelines
 - not be a fugitive economic offender
5. the company should:
- comply with the minimum public shareholding requirements
 - not have trading in its shares suspended
 - not have outstanding dues to the Board, stock exchange or depositories
6. promoters seeking re-classification shall continue to – (a) not hold more than 10% of the voting rights; (b) not directly or indirectly, exercise control and (c) not have special rights at all time from the date of re-classification failing which he/she shall automatically be reclassified as promoter
7. promoters seeking re-classification shall continue to not be represented on the Board or act as KMP for at least 3 years from the date of re-classification failing which he/she shall automatically be reclassified as promoter
- If any public shareholder seeks to re-classify itself as promoter, it shall be required to make an open offer.

IiAS’ stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting for such reclassifications where:

- the company has abided by the spirit of regulatory provisions
- where the change is due to a takeover, change in company ownership, restructuring of shareholding or open offer
- pursuant to a family separation the reclassified promoters are not expected to exercise any management control
- the promoter has not been director or key managerial personnel of the company for a period of at least one year

IiAS believes that promoters should abide by the spirit of the regulation in cases of re-classification. IiAS does not favour subsequent associations with the outgoing promoters (e.g., where a relative of the promoter seeking to be reclassified continues to be on the board). IiAS understands that such associations reflect a relative’s proximity to the promoter and their day-to-day involvement in the company, along with the instances of divulging any relevant market information that may be available.

IiAS’ stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS’ stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS’ Voting Guidelines](#).

50. Buyback

Legal Requirement:

Buyback of shares in India is governed by Sec 68 of the Companies Act 2013, and SEBI (Buyback of Securities) Regulations, 2018. Buyback proposals require shareholder approval by passing a special resolution. As per these regulations, any company willing to buy back some of its shares from the market, needs to:

- Disclose adequate reasons for the buy-back
- Ensure that the buy-back amount is 25% or less of the aggregate of paid-up capital and free reserves of the company
- Ensure that the aggregate debt after buy-back is not more than twice the sum of company’s paid-up capital and free reserves
- Complete the process within one year from the date of passing of the special resolution
- Ensure that no offer of buy-back is made within a period of one year reckoned from the date of the closure of the preceding offer of buy-back
- Ensure that at least 75% of the amount earmarked for buy-back is utilized

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR buyback proposals. IiAS recognizes that share buybacks provide an efficient exit mechanism for shareholders. Every shareholder has a choice: they can tender their shares through the buyback offer if they feel the price is right or they can continue to remain invested. In rare instances, IiAS may caution investors and recommend voting against share buy-backs if it negatively impacts the long-term interests of the company's stakeholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

51. Scheme of Arrangement

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, applications for schemes of arrangement need to be submitted to the concerned National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for approval. The NCLT then directs the company to convene a meeting of its shareholders and creditors and get their approval through a special resolution. The schemes also need to be submitted to the stock exchanges for approval. If the scheme involves entities of the promoter group or envisages issuing additional shares to the promoter group, the scheme needs to be additionally approved by majority of public/minority shareholders.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS' analysis will generally consider the following:

- Valuation and mode of payment
- Dilution of stake and change in shareholding pattern
- Underlying rationale
- Impact on financial and leverage ratios
- Accounting treatment
- Legal and tax implications
- Impact on minority shareholders
- Special rights built into the transaction contours

IiAS believes that though the underlying contours and rationale for each scheme varies, such transactions must be fair to both parties of the merger/amalgamation.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

52. Shareholder director in public sector banks

Legal Requirement:

As per Sec 9 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, if the public shareholding in the bank is above 16.0% but less than 32.0% then two public shareholders can be appointed as directors to represent them.

IiAS' stance:

The bank issues the notice of the shareholder meeting without the names of the shareholder directors. The names of all the proposed appointees are published only after the nominations are received - generally close to the meeting date. Only if the number of nominations is more than the vacancies, are investors

expected to select a shareholder director through vote. As banks generally do not provide a detailed profile of the candidates, IiAS will review information available in public domain and provide its recommendations based on the experience and suitability of the candidate(s).

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

53. Issue of bonus shares

Legal Requirement:

Under Sec 63 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company may issue fully paid-up bonus shares to its shareholders out of its free reserves, securities premium account or capital redemption reserve account by obtaining shareholder approval at a general meeting.

IiAS' stance:

Bonus shares do not change the fundamentals of the company. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR the issuance of bonus shares.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

54. Bonus debentures

Legal Requirement:

There is no specific provision regarding issue of bonus debentures under the Companies Act, 2013. Bonus debentures are usually issued under a scheme of arrangement. As the term 'arrangement' has a very wide import, it includes all modes of re-organisation of share capital. The NCLT and majority of the shareholders have to approve the scheme. Also, the Articles of Association (AoA) of the company have to be amended, if it does not include a provision for issuance.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS' analysis will generally consider the following:

- Current debt levels
- Company's track record of servicing financial obligations
- Publicly available credit ratings provided by credit rating agencies
- Clubbing of resolutions

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There are no specific regulatory provisions governing the issue of bonus debentures. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

55. Option to lenders to convert loan into equity

Legal Requirement:

As per Section 62(3) of the Companies Act 2013, the terms of issue of debentures or loan containing an option to be converted to equity should be approved before the issue of such debentures or the raising of loan by a special resolution passed by the company in a general meeting.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis and will factor in the company's credit quality and quantum of outstanding debt. IiAS understands that lenders typically insist on having a clause for conversion of debt into equity to safeguard their interests in case of default or inability to pay by the company. While the dilution to shareholders could be high if all loans are converted to equity, such a provision is often needed to raise debt from the banking channel.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

56. Remuneration to non-executive directors in case of loss or inadequacy of profits

Legal Requirement:

As per Schedule V of the Companies Act, 2013, in the event of no profits or inadequate profits, non-executive directors and independent directors can receive remuneration in accordance with the limits mentioned below, which are based on the effective capital of the company,

<i>Where the effective capital is</i>	<i>Limit of yearly remuneration payable shall not exceed</i>
(i) Negative or less than 5 crores	Rs. 12 Lakhs
(ii) 5 crores and above but less than 100 crores	Rs. 17 Lakhs
(iii) 100 crores and above but less than 250 crores	Rs. 24 Lakhs
(iv) 250 crores and above	Rs. 24 lakhs plus 0.01% of the effective capital in excess of Rs. 250 crores

The company may pay remuneration over the ceiling limit, if members' approval by way of a special resolution has been taken for a period not exceeding 3 years.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS' voting recommendation will be based on a combination of the following factors:

- Remuneration paid to non-executive directors in past years
- Whether the proposed remuneration is commensurate with the size and scale of the company
- Remuneration paid to one director relative to remuneration paid to other non-executive directors
- Whether the proposed remuneration is in line with peers
- Whether the remuneration is higher than the remuneration paid during years in which the company made adequate profits

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

57. Revised FEMA rules for NRI/OCI

Legal Requirement:

As per Schedule III of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019, a Non-resident Indian (NRI) or an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) may purchase or sell equity instruments of a listed company on repatriation basis, on a recognized stock exchange in India, subject to the following conditions: (i) NRI/OCI may purchase and sell equity instruments through a branch designated by an Authorized Dealer and (ii) the total holding by any individual NRI/OCI shall not exceed 5% of the total paid-up equity capital or 5% of the paid-up value of each series of debentures/preference shares/share warrants issued by the company. Further, the total holding of all NRI/OCI should not exceed 10% of the total paid-up equity capital or 10% of the paid-up value of each series of debentures/preference shares/ share warrants. However, this aggregate ceiling of 10% can be increased to 24% if approved by the members of the company through a special resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such cases where it believes that the proposed limits are within regulatory limits and not prejudicial to the interest of minority shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

58. Keeping registers and returns at a place other than the registered office

Legal Requirement:

Under provisions of Section 94(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, register and index of members and debenture holders along with the copies of annual return are required to be maintained at the registered office of the company. However, these documents can be kept at any other place within the city, town or village in which the registered office is situated or any other place in India in which more than one-tenth of the total members entered in the register of members reside, if approved by a special resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such cases where it believes that the move will not impede the accessibility of documents to shareholders.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

59. Capital reduction

Legal Requirement:

As per the provisions of Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company may, by a special resolution and subject to confirmation by the Tribunal, reduce its share capital in any manner and in, particular, may, (a) extinguish or reduce the liability on any of its shares in respect of the share capital not paid-up; or (b) either with or without extinguishing or reducing liability on any of its shares -
(i) cancel any paid-up share capital which is lost or is unrepresented by available assets or
(ii) pay off any paid-up share capital which is in excess of the wants of the company.
And alter its memorandum by reducing the amount of its share capital and of its shares accordingly.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will consider the following while analyzing the resolution:

- Reason, quantum and manner of reduction of capital
- Valuation aspects
- Impact on minority shareholders
- Capital Structure - Pre and Post reduction of capital
- Financial outgo and operational impact

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

60. Compensation or profit-sharing agreements

Legal Requirement:

As per Regulation 26(6) of SEBI LODR, no employee including key managerial personnel/director/promoter of a company shall enter into any agreement for himself/herself or on behalf of any other person/shareholder/any other third party with regard to compensation or profit sharing in connection with dealings in the securities of the company, unless prior approval has been obtained from the Board of Directors as well as public shareholders by way of an ordinary resolution where all interested persons involved in the transaction covered under the agreement abstain from voting.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally vote AGAINST such arrangements because these align employee interest to a controlled set of shareholders and may promote 'short-termism'. IiAS may, in exceptional cases, support such arrangements after analysing the following parameters:

- Nature of the agreement
- Beneficiaries under the agreement
- Rationale for entering into the agreement
- Whether the agreement aligns the interests of the beneficiaries with that of the company/minority shareholders

IiAS believes that the board must ensure that all aspects of such agreements are fully disclosed to enable shareholders make an informed decision: IiAS may raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided in the shareholder notice.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

61. Approval of special rights post IPO (ratification of rights not embedded in the AoA)

Legal Requirement:

In terms of stock exchange requirements, no single shareholder should be accorded any special rights (including under shareholders'/promoters' agreements) when the company is undergoing an IPO. Accordingly, all special rights granted to specific shareholders are required to fall away at the time of listing of equity shares in the relevant stock exchanges or approved by shareholders via a special resolution or as a practice, are included in the company's articles of association.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will vote on a case-to-case basis on resolutions to provide special rights to a specific set of shareholders/investors. IiAS considers the following provisions prejudicial to the interest of investors and will not support such clauses:

- Where a set of shareholders have board nomination rights disproportionate to their shareholding or if these rights are embedded in permanency and continue even if shareholding levels drop;
- Where identified individuals (usually promoters) have board permanency – they neither retire by rotation nor are appointed for a fixed term: IiAS may make carve-outs to this in line with the amended SEBI regulations which require periodic shareholder approval for such directors w.e.f 1 April 2024;
- Where identified individuals, or those representing an identified set of investors are necessarily required to form quorum for board, board committee and/or shareholder meetings;
- Where identified/named individuals are permanently appointed as Managing Director, Whole-Time Directors, or Chairperson
- Where investor/investor nominee directors are given veto power on board decisions

IiAS generally does not approve of any rights or clauses which provide special/overriding powers to a particular individual/group, which are susceptible to potential misuse and/or are prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders. IiAS expects the company to provide adequate disclosure in the shareholder notice and may raise concerns where sufficient information is not provided.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

62. Migration to Main board from SME platform

Legal Requirement:

As per SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018, a company which has its securities listed on an SME exchange may migrate its securities to the Main Board subject to the following conditions:

- The securities of the company have been listed and traded on the SME Platform for at least 2 years
- The post issue face value capital of the company is more than Rs. 10 crores upto Rs. 25 crores
- Shareholders approve the migration by passing a special resolution through postal ballot. However, the resolution will be acted upon only if the votes cast by the public shareholders in favour of the proposal amount to at least two times the number of votes cast by public shareholders against the proposal
- The company fulfils the eligibility criteria for listing laid down by the Main Board

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. Since companies need to fulfil a pre-defined eligibility criterion, IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such cases where it believes that the migration will help increase participation by retail investors and is expected to increase the liquidity of shares.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

63. Change in the use of IPO proceeds

Legal Requirement:

Under Sections 13 and 27 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company, which has raised money from public through prospectus and still has any unutilized amount out of the money so raised, shall not change its objects for which it raised the money unless a special resolution is passed by the company. In such cases, the dissenting shareholders (i.e., not less than 10% of the shareholders who voted on the resolution in the general meeting) shall be given an opportunity to exit by the promoters and shareholders having control in accordance with the regulations specified under SEBI ICDR.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such proposals based on the company's stated justification and rationale for the change.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

64. Appointment of Alternate Director

Legal Requirement:

Under Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013, a company may, if authorised by its articles or by a resolution, appoint a person, not being a person holding any alternate directorship for any other director in the company or holding directorship in the same company, to act as an alternate director for a director during his absence for a period of not less than three months from India. An alternate director to an independent director must meet the criteria for independence required under regulations. An alternate director shall not hold office for a period longer than that permissible to the original director and shall vacate the office if and when the director in whose place he/she has been appointed returns to India. Further, if the term of office of the original director is determined before he/she returns to India, any provision for the automatic re-appointment of retiring directors in default of another appointment shall apply to the original, and not to the alternate director.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting AGAINST such appointments. However, IiAS may make an exception in cases where employees or key managerial personnel of the company are proposed to be appointed as an alternate director and the resolution relates to his/her continuation as an employee/KMP and/or approval of their remuneration.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

There is a difference between IiAS' stance and current regulations. IiAS uses attendance level of directors in board/ committee/ shareholder meetings as a measure of directors' engagement with the company. IiAS believes that companies must refrain from appointing alternate directors who attend meetings on behalf of an elected director; the elected director must use technology to participate in board/committee meetings. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

SEBI (Real Estate Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014

65. Adoption of accounts

Legal Requirement:

Under Regulation 22(4)(a)(i), annual accounts & performance should be approved by the unit holders in the annual meeting, where votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution. The accounts are to be prepared in accordance with the applicable accounting standards.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS believes that a comprehensive review of the financials is a critical exercise which often requires first-hand information and proper due diligence. However, given the limited time between receipt of the audited accounts and the unit holders' meeting to comprehensively evaluate the financial statements, IiAS relies upon the auditors' report on the financial statements and their commentary thereon. IiAS may also factor in the quality of the audit firm and/or the composition and experience of the audit committee. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR on the resolution to adopt accounts. However, IiAS may recommend voting AGAINST where – (a) auditors have a qualified opinion on the accounts or internal financial controls; (b) the quality of the audit firm and/or the audit committee are a concern; or (c) emphasis of matters outlined by auditors that may have a material impact on the financials, any pending litigations which may have a material impact on the financial statements.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. In our assessment of financial statements, we will provide commentary on key financial parameters. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

66. Adoption of Valuation Report

Legal Requirement:

A full valuation of the assets of the REIT shall be conducted by the valuer at least once in every financial year. Under Regulation 22(4)(a)(iii), the valuation report is to be approved by the unit holders in the annual meeting via simple majority, i.e., votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS' will generally recommend voting FOR adoption of valuation reports as the valuation exercise is conducted in accordance with internationally accepted valuation standards as required by SEBI (REIT) Regulations and The Companies (Registration of Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017. Notwithstanding, IiAS shall also take into consideration the size and experience of the registered valuer while voting on such resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. IiAS provides some data-cuts to help investors review the valuation. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

67.Appointment of Valuer

Legal Requirement:

SEBI REIT regulations require real estate investment trusts to appoint persons registered as registered valuers under Section 247 of the Companies Act 2013, as their valuer. The appointment of a valuer shall be subject to approval of the unit holders at the annual meeting via simple majority, i.e., votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution. The valuer shall not be an associate of the sponsor(s) or manager or trustee and shall have not less than 5 years of experience in valuation of real estate. Further, no valuer shall undertake valuation of the same property for more than four years consecutively; the valuer may be reappointed after a period of not less than two years from the date it ceases to be the valuer of the REIT.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally vote FOR the appointment of the Independent Valuer. IiAS will consider the size, scale of the proprietorship/firm, qualification & experience of the professionals & conflict (if any). IiAS will recommend based on the overall profile of the Valuer (as disclosed in notice, the valuer's website or any other publicly available information) vis-à-vis the requirement of the REIT. IiAS expects the remuneration to be commensurate with the size of the assets.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

68.Appointment and remuneration of auditor

Legal Requirement:

Under SEBI REIT Regulation 22(4)(a)(ii), the auditor's appointment and remuneration should be approved by the unit holders in the annual meeting, where votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution. As per Regulation 10(6A) an individual auditor or an audit firm shall be appointed for not more than one term or two terms of five consecutive years respectively. Thereafter, re-appointment of the auditor shall be subject to a cooling period of five years.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will vote on a case-to-case basis on such resolutions considering the following:

- Tenure of audit firm and tenure of audit partner
- Size of the audit firm
- Experience of the audit firm in the same industry or of similar size or complexity
- The firm/partner(s) past track record/reputation
- Peer review conducted for the audit firm, where applicable
- Publicly available information on the audit firm and the audit partner experience
- Quantum, growth & past track record of audit fees
- Consulting or other services provided by network partners of the audit firm

IiAS believes that the experience and size of the audit firm should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the business. To enhance transparency, IiAS will take into consideration whether details including a brief profile regarding the audit partner and the audit firm are available publicly (e.g., audit firm's website) and disclosed in the notice. IiAS will raise concerns in cases where auditor remuneration is not disclosed.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

69. Removal of statutory auditors

Legal Requirement:

Under Regulations 22 and 26ZM of the SEBI (Real Estate Investment Trust) Regulations, 2014, unitholders can remove statutory auditors by passing a special resolution requiring 60% majority.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS' stance:

Since each instance of auditor removal is different in its circumstances and context, IiAS will decide on a case-to-case basis. However, IiAS may not support removal of auditors if:

- the latest audit reports (annual/quarterly) contain adverse remarks (qualification/matter of emphasis) or
- IiAS has reason to believe that the removal will undermine the integrity of the audit review or
- the board has not provided sufficient rationale for seeking the removal of auditors

IiAS carefully weighs the rationale for the removal of auditors, and will, wherever possible, wait for auditors to state their case to shareholders before making a voting recommendation.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

70. Approval of borrowings

Legal Requirement:

A REIT, whose units are listed on a recognized stock exchange, may issue debt securities subject to regulations. The aggregate consolidated borrowings and deferred payments of the REIT, net of cash and cash equivalents shall never exceed 49% of the value of the REIT assets. Approval of unit holders by simple majority (i.e., votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against it) shall be obtained for any further borrowing in case the aggregate consolidated borrowings and deferred payments of the REIT, net of cash and cash equivalents exceed 25% of the value of the REIT assets. In addition, credit rating shall be obtained from a credit rating agency registered with SEBI.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will consider the following factors in its analysis:

- Current borrowing levels of the REIT
- Rationale for increasing the borrowing limit
- Current credit protection measures and ratios
- Whether the proposed limit is absolute or a rolling limit

IiAS believes that borrowing limits must be sought at judicious levels.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

71. Change in remuneration payable to members of Governing Board

Legal Requirement:

Any change in the management fees of the REIT requires approval of the unit holders in accordance with Regulation 22(6)(b) of the SEBI REIT Regulations, where votes cast in favour of the resolution shall not be less than one and a half times the votes cast against the resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS believes that the fees to the governing board must be linked to the performance of the trust and returns to unit holders and should be comparable across peers. IiAS is unlikely to support open-ended resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

72. Issue of units by REIT

Legal Requirement:

Any subsequent issue of units by the REIT may be by way of follow-on offer, preferential allotment, qualified institutional placement, rights issue, bonus issue, offer for sale or any other mechanism and in the manner as may be specified by SEBI. For this, approval of unit holders by special majority (i.e., 60% majority) shall be obtained.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis, based on the mode of the issue. The analysis will consider the following:

- List of allottees
- Type of investor
- Objects of the issue
- Extent of dilution
- Urgency of funds
- Debt levels and available cash

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

73. Change to the investment management agreement

Legal Requirement:

As per Regulation 22(6), approval of unit holders is required for any material changes to the investment management agreement. These typically relate to change in management fees, changes to the number of appointees (board members, observers) to the board of the investment manager, and changes to the Investment Management Agreement itself. The approval requires a 60% majority.

IiAS' stance:

- SEBI has raised concerns that members external to committees are attending committee meetings, which may impact confidentiality and integrity of discussion. Therefore, IiAS will factor this observation into its voting recommendations for resolution seeking to increase the number of appointees to the board of the investment manager.
- On increases in management fees, IiAS will expect the trusts to link the amount of fees charged to the assets under management.
- For all other changes to the investment management agreement, IiAS will evaluate based on the specifics of the resolution and context of the changes.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

74. Declassification of the status of sponsor

Legal Requirement:

As per Regulation 22(8) of SEBI REIT Regulations, prior approval from seventy-five per cent unit holders by value (excluding the value of units held by parties related to the transaction) is required, in case of:

- a) change in sponsor or inducted sponsor or
- b) change in control of sponsor or change in control of inducted sponsor
- c) conversion to a self-sponsored Investment Manager

Where the requisite approval is not received, the proposed/inducted sponsor/investment manager shall provide an exit opportunity to dissenting unit holders by buying their units in the manner specified by SEBI. If on account of such sale, the number of unit holders forming part of the public falls below regulatory limits and this is not rectified by the manager within one year (on the request of the trustee), the manager shall apply for delisting of the units of the REIT.

Declassification of a sponsor can be achieved if the Trust obtains approval of at least 75% (by value) of the unitholders (excluding related parties). In cases where there is more than one sponsor, one of the sponsors may exit by obtaining unitholder approval. In cases where there is only one sponsor, such sponsor may exit only by obtaining unitholder approval and ensuring that:

- (i) the Trust migrates to a self-sponsored investment manager; or
- (ii) the Trust inducts a new sponsor.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally support the resolution if it does not have a prejudicial impact for minority unitholders. IiAS may raise concerns over subsequent associations with the outgoing sponsors.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

75. Change in sponsor

Legal Requirement:

As per Regulation 22(8) of SEBI REIT Regulations, in case of:

- a. change in sponsor or inducted sponsor or
- b. change in control of sponsor or change in control of inducted sponsor
- c. conversion into a self-sponsored investment manager

prior approval from seventy-five per cent unit holders by value (excluding the value of units held by parties related to the transaction) is required. Where the requisite approval is not received, the proposed/inducted sponsor/investment manager shall provide an exit opportunity to dissenting unit holders by buying their units in the manner specified by SEBI. If on account of such sale, the number of unit holders forming part of the public falls below regulatory limits and this is not rectified by the manager within one year (on the request of the trustee), the manager shall apply for delisting of the units of the REIT.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will factor in the impact on minority unit holders. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such resolutions where the company has abided by the spirit of regulatory provisions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

76. Related party transactions

Legal Requirement:

Under Regulation 19 of the SEBI REIT Regulations, prior approval of unit holders, via simple majority (i.e., where the votes cast in favour of the resolution are required to be more than the votes cast against the resolution) shall be obtained if –

- (a) the total value of related party transactions in a financial year for acquisition or sale of properties or investments in securities exceed 10% of the REIT's asset value;
- (b) borrowings from related parties exceed 10% of the total consolidated borrowings;
- (c) with respect to any properties leased to related parties to the REIT, where: (i) lease area exceeds 20% of the total area of the underlying assets; (ii) value of assets under the lease exceeds 20% of the value of the total underlying assets; (iii) rental income obtained from leased assets exceeds 20% of the value of the rental income of all underlying assets.

Transactions between two or more REITs with a common manager/sponsor or where the manager/sponsor are associates shall be considered as a related party transaction. Voting by any person on a transaction who is a related party in such transaction as well as associates of such person(s) shall not be considered on the specific issue.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting against such transactions if- (a) the sponsor unduly benefits from the transaction; or (b) it cannot be ascertained that the transaction is at arms-length. In assessing these transactions, IiAS will question the underlying rationale for the transaction including its financial impact and valuation metrics. IiAS understands that there are inherent conflicts of interest involved in related party transactions, which must be adequately managed, with comprehensive policies, and accurate monitoring and disclosure. IiAS may raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided in the shareholder notice.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. IiAS will consider all the holistic & relevant factors while making a recommendation. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014

77. Adoption of accounts

Legal Requirement:

Under Reg 22(3)(b)(i) of SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014, annual accounts are to be approved by the unit holders in the annual meeting of the unit holders by a simple majority, i.e., votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS believes that a comprehensive review of the financials is a critical exercise which often requires first-hand information and proper due diligence. However, given the limited time between receipt of the audited accounts and the unit holders' meeting to comprehensively evaluate the financial statements, IiAS relies upon the auditors' report on the financial statements and their commentary thereon. IiAS may also factor in the quality of the audit firm and/or the composition and experience of the audit committee. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR on the resolution to adopt accounts. However, IiAS may recommend voting AGAINST where – (a) auditors have a qualified opinion on the accounts or internal financial controls; (b) the quality of the audit firm and/or the audit committee are a concern; or (c) emphasis of matters outlined by auditors that may have a material impact on the financials, any pending litigations which may have a material impact on the financial statements.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. In our assessment of financial statements, we will provide commentary on key financial parameters. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

78. Adoption of valuation report

Legal Requirement:

A full valuation of the assets of the InvIT shall be conducted by the valuer at least once in every financial year. As per Regulations 21 and 22(3)(b)(i) of the SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014, the valuation report should be approved in the annual meeting of the unit holders by a simple majority.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS' will generally recommend voting FOR adoption of valuation reports as the valuation exercise is conducted in accordance with internationally accepted valuation standards as required by SEBI (INVIT) Regulations and The Companies (Registration of Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017. Notwithstanding, IiAS shall also take into consideration the size and experience of the registered valuer while voting on such resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. IiAS provides some data-cuts to help investors review the valuation. For details, please refer to [IiAS Voting Guidelines](#).

79. Appointment of Valuer

Legal Requirement:

SEBI InvIT Regulations 13(1), 21 & 22(3)(b)(i), require InvITs to appoint persons registered as registered valuers under Section 247 of the Companies Act 2013, as their valuer. The appointment of a valuer shall be subject to approval of the unit holders at the annual meeting via simple majority, i.e., votes cast in favour

of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution. The valuer shall not be an associate of the sponsor(s) or manager or trustee and shall have not less than 5 years of experience in valuation of real estate. Further, no valuer shall undertake valuation of the same property for more than four years consecutively; the valuer may be reappointed after a period of not less than two years from the date it ceases to be the valuer of the InvIT.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally vote FOR the appointment of the Independent Valuer. IiAS will consider the size, scale of the proprietorship/firm, qualification & experience of the professionals & conflict (if any). IiAS will recommend based on the overall profile of the Valuer (as disclosed in notice, the valuer's website or any other publicly available information) vis-à-vis the requirement of the InvIT. IiAS expects the remuneration to be commensurate with the size of the assets.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

80. Approval of statutory auditor's appointment

Legal Requirement:

As per InvIT Regulation 22(3)(b)(i), the auditor's appointment and remuneration should be approved by the unit holders in the annual meeting, where votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against the resolution. As per Regulation 10(6A) an individual auditor or an audit firm shall be appointed for not more than one term or two terms of five consecutive years respectively. Thereafter, re-appointment of the auditor shall be subject to a cooling period of five years.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will vote on a case-to-case basis on such resolutions considering the following:

- Tenure of audit firm and tenure of audit partner
- Size of the audit firm
- Experience of the audit firm in the same industry or of similar size or complexity
- The firm/partner(s) past track record/reputation
- Peer review conducted for the audit firm, where applicable
- Publicly available information on the audit firm and the audit partner experience
- Quantum, growth & past track record of audit fees
- Consulting or other services provided by network partners of the audit firm

IiAS believes that the experience and size of the audit firm should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the business. To enhance transparency, IiAS will take into consideration whether details including a brief profile regarding the audit partner and the audit firm is available publicly (e.g., audit firm's website) and disclosed in the notice. IiAS will raise concerns in cases where auditor remuneration is not disclosed.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

81. Removal of statutory auditors

Legal Requirement:

Regulation 22 of the SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trust) Regulations, 2014, unitholders can remove statutory auditors by passing a special resolution requiring 60% majority.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS' stance:

Since each instance of auditor removal is different in its circumstances and context, IiAS will decide on a case-to-case basis. However, IiAS may not support removal of auditors if:

- the latest audit reports (annual/quarterly) contain adverse remarks (qualification/matter of emphasis) or
- IiAS has reason to believe that the removal will undermine the integrity of the audit review or
- the board has not provided sufficient rationale for seeking the removal of auditors

IiAS carefully weighs the rationale for the removal of auditors, and will, wherever possible, wait for auditors to state their case to shareholders before making a voting recommendation.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

82. Approval for borrowing limits

Legal Requirement:

As per InvIT Regulations 20 and 22, an InvIT whose units are listed on a recognized stock exchange, may issue listed debt securities subject to regulations. The aggregate consolidated borrowings and deferred payments of the InvIT, net of cash and cash equivalents shall not exceed 70% of the value of the InvIT assets. Approval of unit holders by simple majority (i.e., votes cast in favour of the resolution shall be more than the votes cast against it) shall be obtained for any further borrowing in case the aggregate consolidated borrowings and deferred payments of the InvIT exceed 25% of the value of the InvIT assets and by special majority (i.e., seventy-five per cent of the unitholders) in case it exceeds 49% of the value of the InvIT assets. In addition, credit rating shall be obtained from a credit rating agency registered with SEBI.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will consider the following factors in its analysis:

- Current borrowing levels of the INVIT
- Rationale for increasing the borrowing limit
- Current credit protection measures and ratios
- Whether the proposed limit is absolute or a rolling limit

IiAS believes that borrowing limits must be sought at judicious levels.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

83. Change in sponsor

Legal Requirement:

As per InvIT Regulation 22(7), in case of:

- d. change in sponsor or inducted sponsor or
- e. change in control of sponsor or change in control of inducted sponsor
- f. conversion into a self-sponsored investment manager

prior approval from seventy-five per cent unit holders by value (excluding the value of units held by parties related to the transaction) is required. Where the requisite approval is not received, the proposed/inducted sponsor/investment manager shall provide an exit opportunity to dissenting unit holders by buying their units in the manner specified by SEBI.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will factor in the impact on minority unit holders. IiAS will generally recommend voting FOR such resolutions where the company has abided by the spirit of regulatory provisions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

84. De-classification of the status of sponsor

Legal Requirement:

As per InvIT Regulation 22(7), prior approval from seventy-five per cent unit holders by value (excluding the value of units held by parties related to the transaction) is required in case of:

- a) change in sponsor or inducted sponsor or
- b) change in control of sponsor or change in control of inducted sponsor
- c) conversion to a self-sponsored Investment Manager

Where the requisite approval is not received, the proposed/inducted sponsor/investment manager shall provide an exit opportunity to dissenting unit holders by buying their units in the manner specified by SEBI.

Declassification of a sponsor can be achieved if the Trust obtains approval of at least 75% (by value) of the unitholders (excluding related parties). In cases where there is more than one sponsor, one of the sponsors may exit by obtaining unitholder approval. In cases where there is only one sponsor, such sponsor may exit only by obtaining unitholder approval and ensuring that (i) the Trust migrates to a self-sponsored investment manager; or (ii) the Trust inducts a new sponsor.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally support the resolution if it does not have a prejudicial impact for minority unitholders. IiAS may raise concerns over subsequent associations with the outgoing sponsors.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

85. Approve change in investment strategy or in management fees

Legal Requirement:

Consequent amendment and/or restatement to the Investment Management Agreement including any material change in investment strategy or in the management fees of the InvIT, requires approval of the

unit-holders of the InvIT in accordance with Regulations 10 and 22 of the SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014, where votes cast in favour of the resolution shall not be less than one and a half times the votes cast against the resolution.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. When assessing amendment and/or restatement to an investment agreement, IiAS will consider resulting operational efficiency, result on cash flows and impact on other unit holders. IiAS believes that the fees to investment manager must be linked to the performance of the trust and returns to unit holders and should be comparable across peers. IiAS is unlikely to support open-ended resolutions.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

86. Approve related party transactions

Legal Requirement:

Under Regulation 19 of the SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014, prior approval of unit-holders, via simple majority i.e., where the votes cast in favour of the resolution are required to be more than the votes cast against the resolution, shall be obtained if – (a) the total value of existing RPTs in a financial year w.r.t acquisition/sale of assets or investments in securities exceed 5% of InvIT's asset value; (b) borrowings from related parties exceed 5% of total borrowings. Transactions between two or more of InvITs with a common investment manager/sponsor or where the investment manager/sponsor are associates shall be considered as a related party transaction. Voting by any person on a transaction who is a related party in such transaction as well as associates of such person(s) shall not be considered on the specific issue.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis. IiAS will generally recommend voting against such transactions if- (a) the sponsor unduly benefits from the transaction; or (b) it cannot be ascertained that the transaction is at arms-length. In assessing these transactions, IiAS will question the underlying rationale for the transaction including its financial impact and valuation metrics. IiAS understands that there are inherent conflicts of interest involved in related party transactions, which must be adequately managed, with comprehensive policies, and accurate monitoring and disclosure. IiAS may raise concerns over the level of disclosures provided in the shareholder notice.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

87. Issue of units by InvIT

Legal Requirement:

Any subsequent issue of units by the INVIT may be by way of follow-on offer, preferential allotment, qualified institutional placement, rights issue, bonus issue, offer for sale or any other mechanism and in the manner as may be specified by SEBI. For this, approval of unit holders by special majority (i.e., 60% majority) shall be obtained.

IiAS' stance:

IiAS will generally recommend voting on such resolutions on a case-to-case basis, based on the mode of the issue. The analysis will consider the following:

- List of allottees
- Type of investor
- Objects of the issue
- Extent of dilution
- Urgency of funds
- Debt levels and available cash

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).

88. Change to the investment management agreement

Legal Requirement:

As per Regulation 22 of InVIT regulations, approval of unit holders is required for any material changes to the investment management agreement. These typically relate to change in management fees, changes to the number of appointees (board members, observers) to the board of the investment manager, and changes to the Investment Management Agreement itself. The approval requires a 60% majority.

IiAS' stance:

- SEBI has raised concerns that members external to committees are attending committee meetings, which may impact confidentiality and integrity of discussion. Therefore, IiAS will factor this observation into its voting recommendations for resolution seeking to increase the number of appointees to the board of the investment manager.
- On increases in management fees, IiAS will expect the trusts to link the amount of fees charged to the assets under management.
- For all other changes to the investment management agreement, IiAS will evaluate based on the specifics of the resolution and context of the changes.

IiAS' stance vis-a-vis regulatory requirements:

IiAS' stance, we believe, does not differ from the current regulations. Through its analysis and commentary, IiAS is helping investors evaluate the proposal. For details, please refer to [IiAS' Voting Guidelines](#).